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I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain—often
known
as
“distributed
ledger
technology”—has been sold as the most important technological
innovation in today’s economy.1 Even if it is difficult to separate
substance from hype, it is clear that not only have thousands of
blockchain applications been launched, but the biggest firms in
many industries are investing substantial amounts of resources
in blockchain-related efforts.2 However, it is also becoming
apparent that serious and recurrent difficulties are delaying, if
not killing off, what for the time being are still modest
applications of the technology.
This paper aims to ascertain the importance of blockchain
and clarify both the development of blockchain applications and
1. See, e.g., U.K. GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., DISTRIBUTED LEDGER
TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN 8 (2016) (claiming that blockchain
technology “provides the framework for government to reduce fraud, corruption,
error and the cost of paper-intensive processes. It has the potential to redefine
the relationship between government and the citizen in terms of data sharing,
transparency and trust. It has similar possibilities for the private sector.”).
2. Including the food, financial services, energy, pharmaceuticals, health,
aerospace, aviation, telecommunications, IT and communications, transport,
utilities, agriculture, and oil and gas industries. Simon Taylor, Vision, in
DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN, supra note 1, at
24. Based on a survey of 134 global market participants in capital markets,
Greenwich Associates estimate that in 2016 financial service firms and
technology providers spent more than one billion USD worldwide to adopt
blockchain in capital markets alone. RICHARD JOHNSON, GREENWICH ASSOCS.,
BLOCKCHAIN ADOPTION IN CAPITAL MARKETS 6 (2016). The same study
estimated in June 2016 that venture capital investment in blockchain
technology had climbed to over 440 million USD. Id. at 3.
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the necessary adaptive decisions to be made in business firms’
strategies and legal institutions. After introducing the basics of
blockchain and its most disruptive application (so-called smart
contracts), the paper will explore the main challenges faced by
blockchain applications. It will do so from the perspective of the
economic analysis of property rights. It will therefore pay
particular attention to, first, the legal distinction between
contract (personal or in personam) rights and property (real or
in rem) rights;3 and, second, the related distinction between
private and public legal “ordering.”4 As a consequence, the paper
complements efforts to understand the economic effects of
blockchain on transactions that in fact deal only with in
personam rights.5
The analysis will be grounded on the theoretical and
empirical premise that, while market participants can trade
contract rights easily under private ordering arrangements
based on reputational assets and the expectation of future trade,
trading in in rem rights requires a minimum of public ordering—
in particular, an enforcer who is neutral and independent not
only of parties to a given contract but to all holders of property
rights on the type of asset being traded in that market.6
In line with this premise, the paper will analyze how a
common problem of some pioneer applications of blockchain lies
in a tendency to overestimate the power of private ordering and
to minimize that of trusted intermediaries, which has often led

3. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in
the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000);
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification:
The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
S373 (2002).
4. See Benito Arruñada, Coase and the Departure from Property, in THE
ELGAR COMPANION TO RONALD H. COASE 305 (Claude Ménard & Elodie
Bertrand eds., 2016) [hereinafter Arruñada, Coase and the Departure from
Property]; Benito Arruñada, Property as Sequential Exchange: The Forgotten
Limits of Private Contract, 13 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 753 (2017) [hereinafter
Arruñada, Property as Sequential Exchange].
5. See, e.g., Christian Catalini & Joshua S. Gans, Some Simple Economics
of the Blockchain (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22952,
2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22952.
6. See BENITO ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF IMPERSONAL
EXCHANGE: THE THEORY AND POLICY OF CONTRACTUAL REGISTRIES 67–71
(2012) [hereinafter ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS]; Arruñada,
Coase and the Departure from Property, supra note 4; Arruñada, Property as
Sequential Exchange, supra note 4.
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to frustrated expectations.7 This is not a new problem, however,
as land titling and administrative simplification efforts have
been suffering similar problems for the same reason.8 Therefore,
blockchain development can benefit greatly from borrowing
insights from the critical analysis of the recurrent management
and policy mistakes made in these areas. This is particularly so
in property applications, as analyzed in Section 5.
II. A BRIEF ON BLOCKCHAIN AND “SMART CONTRACTS”
A. THE NATURE OF BLOCKCHAIN
Blockchain is the technology underpinning the bitcoin
cryptocurrency.9 As with any other type of money, electronic
money must make sure that it changes hands without risk of
being diverted and is not spent twice by the same individual.10
Traditional payment systems solve these problems by relying on
central, specialized, and trusted third parties such as banks,
payment systems, credit card companies, and clearing houses.11
In contrast, the blockchain solved them with a peer-to-peer
solution.12 It is capable of replacing the trusted third party
because it contains the history of all previous transactions, so is
a source of evidence for establishing who owns what at any given
moment.13 To achieve this feat, it replicates the ledger in a
multitude of computers or “nodes,” making all the history of

7. See infra notes 106–112 and accompanying text.
8. See Benito Arruñada, Pitfalls to Avoid when Measuring the
Institutional Environment: Is ‘Doing Business’ Damaging Business?, 35 J.
COMP. ECON. 729 (2007); Arruñada, Property as Sequential Exchange, supra
note 4.
9. See, e.g., Trevor I. Kiviat, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating
Blockchain Transactions, 65 DUKE L.J. 569, 577 (2015) (“[Blockchain] is the core
innovation driving the bitcoin currency system.”).
10. See, e.g., id. at 577 n.54.
11. See, e.g., Jeremy Clark, Foreword to ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL.,
BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES: A COMPREHENSIVE
INTRODUCTION XI–XIII (2016).
12. See, e.g., Kiviat, supra note 9, at 580 (footnotes omitted) (“[B]lockchain
establishes trust between two parties to a transaction through both a
decentralized public ledger and a cryptographic mechanism that ensures
transactions cannot be changed after the fact. One can easily see why the
creator of this technology called it ‘purely peer-to-peer . . . electronic cash.’”).
13. See, e.g., id. at 578–79 (footnote omitted) (“[Blockchain] makes a
collective accounting by distributing a shared (that is, decentralized) public
ledger—a complete record of all past transactions on the network.”).
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transactions public, accessible, and widely distributed across the
whole network of users.14
Moreover, before entering the ledger, transactions must
achieve the consensus of the community, produced online by a
mechanism in which the participants implicitly agree to change
the blockchain.15 Assume, for example, that A and B are
members of the community of users. E.g., both have bitcoin
“wallets,” a type of software that accesses the Internet without
identifying the owner (a paradigm of impersonality),16 even if
their personal identities are always protected by cryptography.
Assume also that A wants to transfer an asset (e.g., bitcoin
money) to B. A’s wallet first proposes to change the blockchain
to reduce A’s balance and correspondingly increase B’s balance.
This proposal circulates around the network and participants
are invited to confirm it by checking the ledger, which requires
solving a complex cryptographic puzzle. Solving the puzzle
demands plenty of computing power, as it must be done by trial
and error. Some specialized users (called “miners”) compete in
solving it.17 The system motivates these miners by paying them

14. For a reliable introduction, see ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN
CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION
(2016), its printed version will be quoted here, but its draft version is available
at
https://d28rh4a8wq0iu5.cloudfront.net/bitcointech/readings/princeton_
bitcoin_book.pdf?a=1. For detailed explanations, see the descriptions in Rainer
Böhme et al., Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, and Governance, 29 J. ECON.
PERSP. 213, 215–19 (2015); Trevor I. Kiviat, supra note 9, at 576–88; and Carla
L. Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized
Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV. 191, 196–
202 (2016). For the abundant literature that emphasizes blockchain’s potential,
see WILLIAM MOUGAYAR, THE BUSINESS BLOCKCHAIN: PROMISE, PRACTICE,
AND APPLICATION OF THE NEXT INTERNET TECHNOLOGY (2016); DON TAPSCOTT
& ALEX TAPSCOTT, BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION: HOW THE TECHNOLOGY BEHIND
BITCOIN IS CHANGING MONEY, BUSINESS, AND THE WORLD (2016). For a short
introduction, see The Great Chain of Being Sure About Things, ECONOMIST, Oct.
31, 2015, at 19.
15. See Böhme et al., supra note 14, at 217.
16. But see Marc Andreessen, Why Bitcoin Matters, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21,
2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/why-bitcoin-matters (detailing
that this does not mean anonymity: “Much like email, which is quite traceable,
Bitcoin is pseudonymous, not anonymous. Further, every transaction in the
Bitcoin network is tracked and logged forever in the Bitcoin blockchain, or
permanent record, available for all to see. As a result, Bitcoin is considerably
easier for law enforcement to trace than cash, gold or diamonds.”).
17. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 124–30 (showing that for a long
time now, most miners have been operating through “mining pools,” sharing
revenue according to the effort of each miner, which places the pool manager in
AND
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when they create a new block (e.g., twenty-five bitcoin or around
16,387 USD as of the date of this writing). The lucky miner is
paid after other miners confirm the solution (which is an easy
task). Only then is the new block added to the blockchain. In
sum, the ledger is distributed in thousands of computers and the
final version is the one accepted by a majority of computers.18
The system is protected against tampering and revision by
duplication of the blockchain in many computers and
concatenation of any subsequent blocks,19 which makes it
trivially easy to verify that the whole content of the chain has
not been altered. The abovementioned puzzle refers to each
block’s “header” that contains a “hash” produced by a
cryptographic function, plus some other data specific to the block
(e.g., each block contains a timestamp and a link to a previous
block).20 The header is easy to produce on the basis of the
information in the chain.21 Therefore, if the chain’s contents
were modified, the change would cause an easily observable
discrepancy, and the latest block would be rejected.22
Cheating is made even harder by the fact that it is not
possible to predict which specific miner will solve the puzzle.
Moreover, no miner can manipulate the chain because
participants work on the longest chain. By the time a miner
(imagine an A who wants to pay B) has been able to manipulate
it, other participants would already be working on an alternative
blockchain.23 Therefore, a malevolent A would need to lengthen
a strong position, potentially reaching high levels of mining concentration. Even
if their market shares have been fluid, real concentration is unknown because
large miners can participate simultaneously in several pools (a practice known
as “laundering hashes”)).
18. See Vitalik Buterin, The Meaning of Decentralization, MEDIUM (Feb. 6,
2017), https://medium.com/@VitalikButerin/the-meaning-of-decentralizationa0c92b76a274 (distinguishing between architectural (how many computers can
break down?), political (how many people ultimately control the computers?),
and logical (if the system is cut in half, will both halves continue operating?)
decentralization by stating “[b]lockchains are politically decentralized (no one
controls them) and architecturally decentralized (no infrastructural central
point of failure) but they are logically centralized (there is one commonly agreed
state and the system behaves like a single computer)”).
19. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional
Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1462–75 (2011) (detailing the potential benefits
of the costly solution of having redundant repositories of information).
20. See The Great Chain of Being Sure About Things, supra note 14.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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the chain faster than all other users, which in principle would
require A to control more than half of the network’s computers.24
B. SMART CONTRACTS
Blockchain applications have been expanded by embedding
information in the ledger, potentially including in it all steps in
the contractual process, from ensuring the reliable recording and
archiving of data to transferring all types of assets.25 Therefore,
blockchain technology is now applicable not only to payments
but to all sorts of contracts; thus, instead of exchanging digital
tokens valuable by themselves and existing only in the ledger
(such as Bitcoin), parties can exchange representations of claims
in all types of physical or digital assets existing outside the
ledger.

24. See generally JOSHUA A. KROLL, IAN C. DAVEY, & EDWARD W. FELTEN,
THE ECONOMICS OF BITCOIN MINING, OR BITCOIN IN THE PRESENCE OF
ADVERSARIES, 1 (2013), http://www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis2013/papers
/KrollDaveyFeltenWEIS2013.pdf (including an analysis of the different
equilibria of bitcoin participants and the security risks they pose. On this basis,
they “argue that Bitcoin will require the emergence of governance structures,
contrary to the commonly held view in the Bitcoin community that the currency
is ungovernable.”); MAGNUS KEMPE, THE LAND REGISTRY IN THE BLOCKCHAIN
34 (July 2016) (proposing development steps for the future).
25. See, e.g., BLOCKSTACK, https://blockstack.org/ (last visited Oct. 24,
2017) (showing how Blockstack allows registration of identities, public keys and
names in the blockchain, providing more security than traditional identity,
naming, and digital registries); COINSPARK, http://coinspark.org/ (last visited
Oct. 24, 2017) (detailing how CoinSpark allows messages and assets to be added
to bitcoin transactions, allegedly making it possible to “transfer any asset over
the Internet” and “notarize important emails on the blockchain”); COLU,
https://www.colu.com/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2017) (claiming to provide a tool for
creating local economies, including the issuance of digital currencies);
EVERLEDGER, http://www.everledger.io/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2017) (showing
how Everledger is implementing a fraud-prevention registry of luxury goods
such as diamonds, which, by recording their distinguishing attributes, would
help provide proof of identity in case of theft); FACTOM, https://www.factom.com
(last visited Oct. 24, 2017) (showing Factom tried to provide a prototype of land
registry based on the blockchain to the Honduras’ Property Institute). But see
KEMPE, supra note 24, at 11–12, 15 (showing that it is the unique cryptographic
hashes, which serve as verification records, and not the transaction documents,
that are saved in the blockchain (consequently, this is another source of
duplication, as two separate systems are kept in place to preserve both
documents and hashes). The documents can be saved by many other parties,
including parties to the affected transactions. This replication plus the set of
verification records —also duplicated in the blockchain— guarantee that their
integrity is preserved). See generally TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 14, at
115–44 (detailing a general view of blockchain’s applications).
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One of its most ambitious applications is implementing the
decentralized “smart contracts” first proposed by Nick Szabo,
which feature automatic execution: they contain a set of rules
that trigger predefined responses corresponding to particular
contingencies.26 (Vending machines, video-on-demand, and
ATMs could be seen as simplistic antecedents. Multiple
initiatives have been developing to implement smart contracts,
from the very simple to the most complex. )27 In a way, they use
the blockchain ledger as their enforcement mechanism,28 so that
transactions are supposed to be conclusive or “immutable.”
26. Nick Szabo, The Idea of Smart Contracts, MANUSCRIPT (1997)
http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literat
ure/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/securetitle.html (last visited
Aug. 1, 2016). The term, “smart contract” was seemingly first used by Nick
Szabo:
Many kinds of contractual clauses (such as collateral, bonding,
delineation of property rights, etc.) can be embedded in the hardware
and software we deal with, in such a way as to make breach of contract
expensive (if desired, sometimes prohibitively so) for the breacher. A
canonical real-life example, which we might consider to be the
primitive ancestor of smart contracts, is the humble vending machine.
Within a limited amount of potential loss (the amount in the till should
be less than the cost of breaching the mechanism), the machine takes
in coins, and via a simple mechanism, which makes a freshman
computer science problem in design with finite automata, dispense
change and product according to the displayed price. The vending
machine is a contract with bearer: anybody with coins can participate
in an exchange with the vendor. The lockbox and other security
mechanisms protect the stored coins and contents from attackers,
sufficiently to allow profitable deployment of vending machines in a
wide variety of areas.
Id. See also Nick Szabo, Secure Property Titles with Owner Authority,
http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literat
ure/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_idea.html (last
visited Aug. 10, 2016).
27. See Jamie Burke, 99% of Blockchain Startups Are Bullshit, MEDIUM
(Mar. 17, 2017), https://convergence.vc/99-of-blockchain-startups-are-bullshit4cf11a549895 (showing that, in fact, most smart contracts are quite dumb: “It’s
often very simple if-this-then-that”). For instance, payment to miners adding a
block is deferred until 99 more blocks have been added to the chain. Similarly,
decentralized crowdfunding services automatically go ahead only with projects
that receive enough funding. See, e.g., LIGHTHOUSE PARTNERS, http://www
.lighthouse-partners.com/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2016).
28. Kiviat, supra note 9, at 603–05 (stating that decentralized smart
contracts are understood as “contracts that leverage a secure public ledger as
an enforcement mechanism”). The basis of smart contracts is that they add
conditions to the simple set of instructions (“script”) of a bitcoin transaction,
which consists of only three parts: “(1) Party A sends a message to the network
declaring the transaction; (2) Party B accepts the transaction by broadcasting
its acceptance; and (3) the network participants verify the transaction’s
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Understandably, the blockchain is often defined as a “trust
machine” because it, supposedly, “lets people who have no
particular confidence in each other collaborate without having to
go through a neutral central authority. Simply put, it is a
machine for creating trust.”29 In this vein, some authors argue
that smart contracts are such a fundamental innovation in the
way transactions are organized and the scope for their
application is so wide that they threaten the position of all sorts
of intermediaries that provide trust or overcome the lack of trust
between traders, including, most prominently, the role of
lawyers.30 However, smart contracts are subject to serious
authenticity.” Id. Added conditions could reflect the parties’ desire that the
transaction occur only under certain circumstances or at a certain time, etc. Id.
29. The Trust Machine, ECONOMIST (Oct. 31, 2015) (also stating that “[t]he
blockchain . . . [i]n essence . . . is a shared, trusted, public ledger that everyone
can inspect, but which no single user controls. The participants in a blockchain
system collectively keep the ledger up to date: it can be amended only according
to strict rules and by general agreement,” and “[t]he real innovation [behind
bitcoin] is not the digital coins themselves, but the trust machine that mints
them—and which promises much more besides.”). But see NARAYANAN ET AL.,
supra note 14, at 280 (emphasis added) (showing how complementary reliance
on trusted components is necessary for achieving security, the real objective and
a much less ambiguous term than trust, which is only one of the means to
achieve it and stating that “‘Trust minimization’ is a worthwhile goal in the
sense that other things being equal, we want to build systems with fewer
components that we’re reliant on for security. But when you have a hammer,
everything looks like a nail, and Bitcoin enthusiasts often get carried away with
removing trusted components from systems. A trusted component is not always
bad, and the existence of a real-world trust relationship is certainly not a
problem by itself.”).
As we will see below, the applications make ample use of intermediaries
acting as “trusted components.”
30. For example, a major Australian law firm concludes:
At this stage, we aren’t convinced that “smart contracts” will replace
lawyers altogether. Currently, most use cases for smart contracts
involve the execution of relatively simply contractual instructions or
control functions. Some of the real advantages of smart contracts arise
in the context of low value payments, which would cost more to enforce
than the value of the transactions. For a smart contract to work
effectively, the parties to a transaction need to be able to precisely
define an outcome to make it the subject of code. The more complicated
the provision or relationship, the more difficult it will be to code.
However, it is likely that over time, smart contracts will apply to
increasingly complicated situations, and be used for different purposes
beyond simple commercial transactions.
ALLENS LINKLATERS, BLOCKCHAIN REACTION: UNDERSTANDING THE
OPPORTUNITIES AND NAVIGATING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS OF DISTRIBUTED
LEDGER TECHNOLOGY AND BLOCKCHAIN 15 (2016) (emphasis added), http://
www.allens.com.au/data/blockchain/index.htm?sku=fsdah5e556eqweqwg.
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limitations. As we will see below, once we move away from
extremely simple transactions, it is necessary to consider a large
number of possible contingencies, and this exponentially
multiplies the difficulty of codifying the proper contractual
outcomes. When envisioning these systems, we must avoid
falling into the trap pointed out by Hayek with respect to
economic planning:31 scientific and statistical information is
relatively easy to collect, aggregate, and transfer, but specific
information includes “circumstances of time and place” that are
well-nigh impossible to aggregate or transfer. Knowledge
necessary for completing contracts often hinges on specific
circumstances that cannot be easily standardized or conveyed.
Moreover, automatic execution is costly to the extent that it
would preclude efficient breach.32
III. BLOCKCHAIN AND CONTRACT, IN PERSONAM,
RIGHTS
In principle, as explained above, the blockchain makes no
use of specialized third parties for enforcement. It is not
uncommon to find claims that blockchain or “DLTs [distributed
ledger technologies] pose a threat to any hierarchical structure
through an ability to connect and operate in a distributed

31. See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON.
REV. 519, 524 (1945) (“[T]he sort of knowledge with which I have been concerned
is knowledge of the kind which by its nature cannot enter into statistics and
therefore cannot be conveyed to any central authority in statistical form. The
statistics which such a central authority would have to use would have to be
arrived at precisely by abstracting from minor differences between the things,
by lumping together, as resources of one kind, items which differ as regards
location, quality, and other particulars, in a way which may be very significant
for the specific decision. It follows from this that central planning based on
statistical information by its nature cannot take direct account of these
circumstances of time and place, and that the central planner will have to find
some way or other in which the decisions depending on them can be left to the
‘man on the spot.’”).
32. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 266 (5th
ed. 2008) (“[G]iven costly renegotiations . . . the damage remedy for breach of
contract has an advantage over specific performance, just as compensation has
an advantage over injunction in nuisance cases with negotiation costs.”). Law
and economics has developed a whole subfield around the concepts of incomplete
contracts and efficient breach. See also STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 304–14 (2004) (analyzing remedies for breach of
performance, including different type of damages and specific performance).
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network, without trusted or necessary intermediaries.”33 In
particular, smart contracts are supposed to work without thirdparty intervention, which theoretically avoids the risk of ledger
manipulation by governments or other third parties. To this
extent, smart contracts could, therefore, be understood as a
paradigm of pure private ordering.34
In fact, however, blockchain applications require the
intervention of between-parties intermediaries to write the code,
run the system, and store data, in order to manage what can be
seen as mere contract or in personam rights.35 For instance, in
addition to those making the rules,36 blockchain applications

33. Phil Godsiff, Disruptive Potential, in DISTRIBUTED LEDGER
TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN, supra note 1, at 61 (emphasis added); see
also Fred Ehrsam, How the Blockchain Could Change Corporate Structure,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 19, 2016, 10:39 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-theblockchain-could-change-corporate-structure-1476887998 (“[W]e will no longer
need central companies to act as the middleman.”).
34. Cf. TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 14, at 199–201 (showing
blockchain has been considered by Libertarians as a means to get rid of the
state altogether). However, a more nuanced view is in order. For instance:
While a maximalist vision for decentralization might involve
dismantling the state, this is not really [a] viable vision, especially
when others who share our democracy want [a state]. However,
decentralization through technology is not necessary in opposition to
the state at all. In fact, they can be mutually beneficial. For example,
assuming well-identified parties, transfers of smart property can use
the block chain for efficient transfers and still use the court system if
there is a dispute. We think the big opportunity for block-chain
technology is implementing decentralization in a way that
complement[s] the functions of the state, rather than seeking to
replace them.
NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 285.
35. For an introduction to the distinction between property (in rem) and
contract (in personam) rights, see Merrill & Smith, supra note 3; Hansmann &
Kraakman, supra note 3. See also ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 6, at 15–34 (discussing the distinction’s economic consequences);
Arruñada, Coase and the Departure from Property, supra note 4, at 305–19
(discussing the distinction’s economic consequences).
36. Trust in a governing third party is required for the continued operation
of blockchain applications. Rules need to be changed, and governance decisions
are recurrently needed. This raises a paradox because:
[O]nce you address the problem of governance, you no longer need
blockchain; you can just as well use conventional technology that
assumes a trusted central party to enforce the rules, because you’re
already trusting somebody (or some organization/process) to make the
rules. . . . The differences to conventional technology are no longer that
apparent. Perhaps blockchain technologies can still deliver better
technical performance, like better availability and data integrity. But
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may require other agents, such as “oracles,” to monitor external
or “off-blockchain” information for conditions that trigger
contractual execution (e.g., whether the market price of oil
reaches a certain level when that level is specified in a
conditional clause of the contract), as well as “curators,” to
perform a variety of functions, including the pre-selection of
application proposals and the prevention of attacks.37 Even the
dependence on oracles is thought to “undermine the goal of
agreements free of human caprice.”38 And it is undeniable that
curators add some degree of centralization and specialized
enforcement.39 Moreover, there are reasons to think that the
it’s not clear to me what real changes to economic organization and
power relations they could bring about.
Vili Lehdonvirta, The Blockchain Paradox: Why Distributed Ledger
Technologies May Do Little to Transform the Economy, POL’Y & INTERNET BLOG
(Nov. 21, 2016), http://blogs.oii.ox.ac.uk/policy/the-blockchain-paradox-whydistributed-ledger-technologies-may-do-little-to-transform-the-economy.
Additionally, there might be economies of scope (with respect to rule
making and rule enforcement) in providing the level of trust required to
safeguard the operation of the trading system. See, e.g. Curry, Global
Perspectives in DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN,
supra note 1, at 77 (“Federated trust enables confidence and risk reduction.”).
This may be why, according to Lehdonvirta, systems such as RSCoin and R3
openly rely on trusted third parties. Lehdonvirta, supra (“R3’s design seems to
have something . . . which look[s] a lot like trusted third-party enforcers . . . .
RSCoin likewise relies entirely on trusted third parties.”).
37. Not-So-Clever Contracts, ECONOMIST (July 28, 2016) [hereinafter NotSo-Clever Contracts], http://www.economist.com/news/business/21702758-timebeing-least-human-judgment-still-better-bet-cold-hearted (“[T]rusted parties,
known as oracles, could supply the data to a blockchain[.]”); The Curator, THE
DAO, https://daohub.org/curator.html [https://archive.is/jFmPb] (“A curator is a
failsafe mechanism that indirectly prevents malicious actors from executing [a]
51% attack”); see also What Is Ethereum Classic, CRYPTOCOMPARE (Aug. 3,
2016, 11:05 AM), https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/what-isethereum-classic; The DAO, the Hack, the Soft Fork and the Hard Fork,
CRYPTOCOMPARE
(Sept.
28,
2017,
5:10
PM),
https://www
.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/the-dao-the-hack-the-soft-fork-and-the-hardfork.
38. Not-So-Clever Contracts, supra note 37.
39. In the DAO case analyzed next in Section III.A, the six “curators” were
private individuals who, among other functions, pre-selected proposals. The
DAO, the Hack, the Soft Fork and the Hard Fork, supra note 37. The DAO
claimed:
A Curator is a failsafe mechanism that indirectly prevents malicious
actors from executing 51% attack. Curators do not add centralization
to the DAO: they are nominated by the DAO Token Holders
themselves, and can be fired at any time, for any reason. Curators
curate the whitelist, the list of Contractors authorized to receive ether
from the DAO.
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development of applications and, in particular, smart contracts
will increasingly rely on modules created and vetted by
specialists: the supply side of the industry will likely be based on
a chain of multiple vertically-linked suppliers.40
A. THE PRESENCE OF CENTRAL ENFORCERS
More revealingly, smart contracts may even require
enforcers in a more traditional sense for contract completion.41
The Curator, supra note 37. Curators within the DAO only performed two
functions:
Check that the published Contract on the Ethereum blockchain
matches the source code the Contractor claims to have deployed (this
is done by comparing bytecode).
Confirm that a Proposal comes from an identified person or
organization. This is done by asking the entity submitting the Proposal
to send a signed transaction with a certain set of data only known to
the Curator and the author of the Proposal, thereby confirming the
author of the Proposal.
Id. These two functions were also performed by token holders, who were also
responsible for evaluating proposals, auditing proposals’ “smart contract code,”
providing legal advice regarding proposals, and taking “economic
responsibility” for the proposals. Id. However, their enforcement role became
evident during evolution of the venture. Ryan Shea, Simple Contracts Are Better
Contracts: What We Can Learn from the Meltdown of the DAO, BLOCKSTACK
BLOG (June 17, 2016), https://blog.blockstack.org/simple-contracts-are-bettercontracts-what-we-can-learn-from-the-dao-6293214bad3a#.ym078tjga
(“The
Ethereum community found itself in a position where it had to step in and
reverse the damage, thereby essentially making a small number of players the
enforcers of the truth of all contracts.”).
40. See, e.g., Demian Brener, The Ugly Truth About Blockchain, MEDIUM
(Sep. 29, 2016), https://blog.zeppelin.solutions/the-ugly-truth-about-blockchainapplications-73e55cad9582 (providing an example of such a module).
41. Competitive
arbitration
implemented
through
“2-out-of-3
multisignature transactions” is one form of relatively conventional third-party
enforcement. See, e.g., NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 278–79. Even
Bitcoin works with a substantial degree of human rulemaking:
[T]he initial version of the software was published by Satoshi
Nakamoto (a pseudonym). In 2010, Nakamoto handed control of the
project to Gavin Andresen, an Australian-born programmer living in
the United States. Like any software, Bitcoin needs to be regularly
updated to address bugs, security issues, and changes in the operating
environment. Such an update can in principle change any aspect of the
software, including accounting and ownership rules. Who gets to write
the software and how that process is governed is therefore critically
important to all participants in a distributed ledger system.
In the case of Bitcoin, the software is governed by an ad hoc
process involving a handful of informal institutions and power
holders. . . . The software is open source and anyone can suggest
changes to it, but technical authority to admit changes to the official
version of the software is held by a team of five core developers
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This presence of third party enforcement was clearly pointed out
by “The DAO” incident occurring in 2016 in the Ethereum
platform, which was then considered the paradigm of smart
contracts,42 and aimed to implement the “code is law” principle
coined by Lessig,43 according to which the code itself provides
conclusive enforcement.44 After an initial successful launch of

appointed by Andresen. The core developers’ power is constrained by
an informal self-imposed charter, which states that significant
changes to the rules require broad consensus from the community. . . .
This governance process worked well when the changes to the code
were uncontroversial bug fixes, but it has started to show signs of
breaking down recently, because some decisions require choosing
which stakeholders’ interests to prioritise over others’.
Vili Lehdonvirta & Ali Robleh, Governance and Regulation: Two Types of RuleMaking, in DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN, supra
note 1, at 43.
42. See, e.g., Kiviat, supra note 9, n.238 (citing Ethereum as a foundational
smart contract blockchain application); Reyes, supra note 14, at 191 n.1, 201
n.61 (same). For additional information regarding Ethereum, see Ethereum,
White Paper: A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application
Platform, GITHUB, https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper (last
visited Aug. 1, 2016) (Ethereum’s foundational manifest); Ethereum, Ethereum
Homestead Documentation, ETHEREUM HOMESTEAD, http://www.ethdocs.org/en
/latest (last visited Aug. 1, 2016).
43. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE, AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999);
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 (2006). A narrower version of the same
concept is that of Lex Cryptographia: “blockchain technology raises a series of
novel legal questions that refer to a new body of law—which we term Lex
Cryptographia—or rules administered through self-executing smart contracts
and decentralized (autonomous) organizations.” Aaron Wright & Primavera De
Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia,
SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK 4 (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract
=2580664.
44. Ethereum sees itself as a platform for all sorts of automaticallyenforced contracts without intermediaries:
Ethereum is a decentralized platform that runs smart contracts:
applications that run exactly as programmed without any possibility
of downtime, censorship, fraud or third party interference.
These apps run on a custom built blockchain, an enormously
powerful shared global infrastructure that can move value around and
represent the ownership of property. This enables developers to create
markets, store registries of debts or promises, move funds in
accordance with instructions given long in the past (like a will or a
futures contract) and many other things that have not been invented
yet, all without a middle man or counterparty risk.
ETHEREUM BLOCKCHAIN APP PLATFORM, (emphasis added) https://www
.ethereum.org/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2016). Ethereum also encourages users to:
[C]reate a tradeable digital token that can be used as a currency, a
representation of an asset, a virtual share, a proof of membership or
anything at all. These tokens use a standard coin API, so your contract
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The DAO, an incident showed that implementing this principle
is harder than it seems, as a failure in the original drafting of
the contract led to its subsequent revision, showing that its
terms were not conclusive and the blockchain was not
immutable.
The DAO (the acronym stood for “Decentralized
Autonomous Organization”) was a sort of venture capital fund
structured as a smart contract to which any investor could
contribute “ether,” the Ethereum’s cryptocurrency, thus
purchasing shares (“tokens”) and voting rights, which they then
used on the projects they decided to support.45 In June 2016,
after it had raised up to $250 million from thousands of backers,
it emerged that someone had used a bug in its code to “siphon”
from its original owners about $60 million worth of ether.46 After
using similar tactics to fight a so-called DAO war for weeks,47
the Ethereum team decided to implement a “hard fork.” (A hard

will be automatically compatible with any wallet, other contract or
exchange also using this standard.
Id.
45. The DAO, the Hack, the Soft Fork and the Hard Fork, supra note 37.
46. Paul Vigna, Ethereum Gets Its Hard Fork and the ‘Truth’ Gets Tested,
WALL ST. J. (July 20, 2016), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2016/07/20
/ethereum-gets-its-hard-fork-and-the-truth-gets-tested. The heart of the debate
was how to characterize the action by the “hacker”: while many observers
considered it as theft, the hacker alleged that it was simply the pre-established
reward for having detected a loophole in the code. In an open letter addressed
to the DAO and the Ethereum community, this self-described “Attacker” argued
the following:
I have carefully examined the code of The DAO and decided to
participate after finding the feature where splitting is rewarded with
additional ether. I have made use of this feature and have rightfully
claimed 3,641,694 ether, and would like to thank the DAO for this
reward. It is my understanding that the DAO code contains this feature
to promote decentralization and encourage the creation of “child DAOs.”
I am disappointed by those who are characterizing the use of this
intentional feature as “theft”. I am making use of this explicitly coded
feature as per the smart contract terms and my law firm has advised
me that my action is fully compliant with United States criminal and
tort law. For reference please review the terms of the DAO.
An Open Letter: To the DAO and the Ethereum Community, PASTEBIN, (June
18, 2016) (emphasis added), http://pastebin.com/CcGUBgDG. Apparently, “this
withdrawal of funds, while unexpected, did not violate either Ethereum’s or The
DAO’s rules, naïve as they may have been. Nor does it appear to have violated
any laws.” Patrick Murck, Who Controls the Blockchain?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr.
19, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/04/who-controls-the-blockchain.
47. See Mathew Leising, The Ether Thief, BLOOMBERG MKT. (June 13,
2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2017-the-ether-thief/.
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fork consists of modifying the software so that it will validate
blocks that the previous version considered invalid. It can
pursue different goals, from eliminating security hazards in the
code to implementing new functions or, as in this case, reversing
transactions. )48 If the changes proposed by the Ethereum team
were adopted by the community of users, by simply upgrading
the software, this would effectively delete the allegedly
fraudulent transactions and refund the money to its previous
owners, but would endanger the conclusiveness of the
contracting process. Consequently, “the Ethereum community
found itself in a position where it had to step in and reverse the
damage, thereby essentially making a small number of players
the enforcers of the truth of all contracts.”49
The hard fork therefore denied the conclusiveness or
immutability that was predicated of smart contracts, which were
supposed to have the law enshrined in the code, making
enforcement and dispute resolution unnecessary.50 In
particular, the Ethereum team was accused of conflict of
interests and, in particular, of supporting the conclusiveness of
transactions only “until something goes wrong that impacts the
interests of a centralized authority.”51 Some degree of
centralization was made visible by the promoters’ power to
manage the system. Moreover, their ability to do so hinted that
the possibility of similar interventions was present in all other
blockchain applications.

48. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 73. On the contrary, in a so-called
soft fork, “all new blocks continue to meet the requirements of the old rules, so
the old clients will accept new blocks as valid additions to the block chain. . . .
Any change in the rules governing what constitutes the authoritative block
chain will necessarily be a hard fork.” Michael Abramowicz, CryptocurrencyBased Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 359, 382 n.128 (2016).
49. Shea, Simple Contracts Are Better Contracts, supra note 39.
50. Id. (“There are two problems here. First, when Ethereum allows forks
to happen and override smart contract code, it’s giving up on ‘code as law’ and
allowing the spirit of code to trump it when the execution deviates from the
spirit. . . . Second, this casts doubt on the true decentralization of the system
and invites regulators and oppressive regimes to step up in the future and apply
pressure to reverse history and/or change the rules of the system. . . . Smart
contracts are either ‘code as law’ or else they are mere social contracts.”). The
key issue is, in these terms, that the hard fork treated them as social contracts.
51. Avtar Sehra, Building a Decentralised Ecosystem, SLIDESHARE, slide 9
(Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.slideshare.net/arcatomia/ethereum-classic-18august-2016?qid=f687c929-6875-4c92-9f42-422ceaba64cc&v=&b=&from
_search=7.
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Consequently, the community was split and some important
miners and exchanges started backing an alternative currency,
called “Ethereum Classic” (ETC), which uses the original
blockchain.52 Those who held Ether on it retained their rights,
but for the funds stolen in the DAO attack.53 In the end, “that
group of miners continued to mine the original (pre-fork) chain,
essentially creating a new coin dubbed Ethereum Classic. By
continuing on the non-forked chain, they . . . created two worlds:
one where the DAO, along with all the consequences of its hack,
still existed, and one where it never happened.”54
This dual reality is possible because, while the only right
that users of a conventional centralized currency have is to stop
using it,55 users of a cryptocurrency have another option: they
can also fork the rules, meaning that they “would rather operate
under a different rule set, and . . . go in a different direction from
the lead developers.”56 This is visible in a hypothetical example,
taking Bitcoin as a reference:
We can think of the currency we had up until the fork as being Bitcoin
[i.e., in the real case, Ethereum]—the big happy Bitcoin that everyone
agreed on. After the fork it’s as if, A-coin [i.e., Ethereum]
corresponding rule set A and B-coin [i.e., Ethereum Classic]
corresponding to rule set B. At the moment of the fork, everyone who
owned one bitcoin receives one A-coin and one B-coin. From that point
on, A-coin and B-coin operate as separate currencies, and they might
operate independently. The two groups might continue to evolve their
rules in different ways.
We should emphasize that not just the software, or the rules, or
the software implementing the rules forked—the currency itself
forked. This is an interesting event that can happen in a
cryptocurrency that couldn’t happen in a traditional currency, where
the option of forking is not available to users.57

52. See The DAO, the Hack, the Soft Fork and the Hard Fork, supra note
37; Duncan Riley, Ethereum Classic Takes Off Following Ethereum Hard Fork,
SILICON ANGLE (July 25, 2016), http://siliconangle.com/blog/2016/07/25/
ethereum-classic-takes-off-following-ethereum-hard-fork/.
53. Ian DeMartino, As Ethereum Classic Forks, DAO Hacker Moves Funds,
INSIDE BITCOINS (Oct. 25, 2016, 12:05 PM), http://insidebitcoins.com/news/
ethereum-classic-forks-dao-hacker-moves-funds/36505.
54. Id.
55. In general, most holders of claims in Williamsonian “relational
contracts” (see infra note 80 and related text) are in a similar position: for
instance, after failing in a shareholders’ meeting to advance their proposals and
change the course of the corporation, minority shareholders can only vote with
their feet by selling their stock.
56. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 171.
57. Id. at 172.
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The evolution of both coins in the market (here composed
not only of investors but also of exchanges and miners), in terms
mainly of price and volume, hints how adequate the two sets of
rules are. For instance, Ethereum Classic immediately became
the third most traded cryptocurrency behind Bitcoin and the
hard fork version of ether.58 Some months later, it had “refused
to die despite the Ethereum Foundation’s repeated attempts to
kill it”59 and looked relatively strong,60 a remarkable
achievement considering that it had suffered numerous
attacks.61 The survival of the two coins plus the fact that their
total value was soon greater than the pre-forked value also
suggest that the diversity of rules (with immutability in
Ethereum Classic but more efficient breach in Ethereum)62 and,
perhaps, the availability of such a competitive process for setting
rules are valuable, probably providing better adaptation, as well
as better control of developers.
However, even if the goal of Ethereum Classic was to
preserve the immutability of the blockchain and the
conclusiveness of transactions, its claims of code-as-law were
somehow diluted, by recognizing that “the infrastructure is not
there to enforce and uphold law, it’s only a protocol that allows
execution of immutable transactions and programs.”63 Despite

58. Riley, Ethereum Classic Takes Off Following Ethereum Hard Fork,
supra note 52.
59. Frances Coppola, Ethereum’s Latest Hard Fork Shows It Has a Very
Long Way to Go, FORBES (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/francescoppola/2016/11/26/ethereums-latest-hard-fork-shows-it-has-a-verylong-way-to-go/#6e4220f1443a.
60. For example, on October 17th, 2016, the market capitalization of
Ethereum Classic was 9.33% that of Ethereum, making it the fifth
cryptocurrency according to this metric. Thirteen months later (November 10,
2017), however, its market capitalization had fallen to 4.83% of Ethereum and
it was only the tenth cryptocurrency; and, even if its price had increased
between those two dates by a multiple close to twelve, this was much less than
Ethereum’s 23.6 (numbers calculated by the author with data obtained from
https://coinmarketcap.com/). Given that, at that point, the main difference
between the two coins was the original conflict, the market (and, crucially, the
exchanges, as Classic was only traded by a few of them) was apparently not very
appreciative of the conservativeness of Ethereum Classic with respect to
immutability.
61. See Jamie Redman, A Victorious Rebellion? Microsoft Investigates
Ethereum Classic’s Potential, BITCOIN.COM (Sept. 27, 2016), https://news
.bitcoin.com/microsoft-looks-rebel-ethereum-classic/.
62. On efficient breach, see supra note 32.
63. Sehra, supra note 51, at slide 10.
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being presented as a decentralized, non-governed blockchain
system, Ethereum Classic also relied on third-party
enforcement, only in the more conventional form of state
intervention.64 As argued by one of its developers, the solution
for failures should be based on “Legal Recourse. If anything goes
wrong the infrastructure cannot be controlled into changing its
state, recourse for financial crime and other illegal activities
needs to take place through normal channels.”65 It can be
concluded that, at least for fraud cases, Ethereum Classic relies
on standard legal recourse (what could also be understood as a
form of third-party contract completion) and blockchain
integrity is dissociated from self-enforcement.66
Ethereum Classic was a paradigm, but it is not a unique
case. Bitcoin itself suffered a similar experience in the summer
of 2017, when trying to reach a consensus to solve the technical,
economic, and ideological conflict between miners, who wanted
bigger block sizes, and code developers, who stressed security.67
There was substantial uncertainty, which initially harmed the
coin price and seemingly also gave rise to the creation of another
coin (named “Bitcoin Cash”) through a hard fork.68 The episode
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Moreover, only a few months after its inception, Ethereum Classic itself
proposed a rather technical hard fork to deal with several attacks it was
suffering due to vulnerabilities in its code. Understandably, and despite not
changing the history of blockchain, the proposal posed risks and triggered a
similar controversy, with some parties claiming it would breach the “dogmatic
application of immutability” that had been the main reason to create this new
cryptocurrency in the first place. Andrew Quentson, Ethereum Classic Divided
over the Proposed Hardfork, CRYPTOCOINS NEWS (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www
.cryptocoinsnews.com/ethereum-classic-divided-proposed-hardfork/.
67. See Lulu Yilun Chen & Yuji Nakamura, Bitcoin Is Having a Civil War
Right as It Enters a Critical Month, BLOOMBERG (July 10, 2017), https://www
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-10/bitcoin-risks-splintering-as-civil-warenters-critical-month (stressing the opposite views of developers and miners).
68. Id.; see also Frances Coppola, The Fundamental Conflict at The Heart
of Bitcoin, FORBES (July 26, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/
2017/07/26/the-fundamental-conflict-at-the-heart-of-bitcoin/2/#7ecd3d15aac7
(stressing the traditional monetary conflict between value and liquidity); David
Z. Morris, Bitcoin’s King Solomon Moment, SLATE (June 6, 2017), http://www
.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2017/06/internal_conflict_could_spl
it_bitcoin_in_half.html (stressing consequences for the different participants,
including blockchain applications with different business models). Contra
Samson Mow, The Bitcoin Cash Fork Was a Dangerous Trick, FORTUNE (Aug.
7, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/07/bitcoin-cash-bch-hard-fork-blockchainusd-coinbase/; Jake Smith, The Bitcoin Cash Hard Fork Will Show Us Which
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showed again how the deficit in formal governance structures
was decided by a hard fork, disciplining developers in the same
way as the DAO incident suffered by Ethereum one year
earlier.69 The Bitcoin Cash event suggests that hard forks may
become a structural and recurrent feature of these systems,
somehow similar to hostile tender offers in the market for

Coin Is Best, FORTUNE (Aug. 11, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/11/bitcoincash-hard-fork-price-date-why/ (defending the idea that “the split achieved the
desirable outcome of allowing both visions of Bitcoin to compete in the free
market.”). At the time of writing, Smith’s idea seemed to be winning the
argument: the price of both coins combined was greater, and, even though
Bitcoin prices had soared, Bitcoin Cash was the fourth cryptocurrency by
market capitalization, equal to 7.48% of that of Bitcoin, and its price was 7.49%
of that of Bitcoin (calculated on August 13, 2017 by the author with data
obtained from https://coinmarketcap.com/; probably not fully informative given
the relative lack of liquidity). Some days later, it had mined the first 8BM block
but there were still some concerns about excessive concentration of miners.
Josiah Wilmoth, The First 8MB Bitcoin Cash Block Was Just Mined,
CRYPTOCOINS NEWS (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/first8mb-bitcoin-cash-block-just-mined/. The availability of the new coin did not
satisfy all parties and yet another hard fork was expected to take place in
November 2017. Anupam Varshney, Bitcoin Is Splitting Once Again—Are You
Ready?, THE COIN TELEGRAPH (Aug. 18, 2017), https://cointelegraph.com/news/
bitcoin-is-splitting-once-again-are-you-ready. However, the new coin was
cancelled on November 8th. Mike Belshe, Segwit2x Final Steps, LINUX FOUND.
(Nov. 8, 2017), https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-segwit2x
/2017-November/000685.html. In the following days, the price of Bitcoin fell
while that of Bitcoin Cash soared, doubling its relative price to reach a
maximum of 15.85% on November 10th (relying on prices given by
https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies).
69. Even if there have been few hard forks, the ones that have taken place
illustrate that they may end up with different outcomes. In 2014, the MintPal
exchange suffered a hack that led to two million USD in VeriCoin tokens being
stolen. Subsequently, developers reclaimed the funds by what is said to be the
first hard fork. Clay Michael Gillespie, VeriCoin Developer Speaks with CCN on
MintPal Hardfork, CRYPTOCOIN NEWS (July 15, 2014), https://www
.cryptocoinsnews.com/vericoin-developer-speaks-ccn-mintpal-hardfork/. Also in
2014, after Nxt had suffered a 1.75 million USD theft, developers also proposed
a hard fork, but it was rejected. Most of the funds were recovered through
negotiations but only after paying ransom to the hacker. Brandon Hurst, $1.75
Million Hack Raises Prospect of Hard Fork: A Price Not Worth Paying (Oct. 31,
2014), https://bitcoinblog.de/2014/10/31/1-75-million-hack-raises-prospect-ofhard-fork-a-price-not-worth-paying/. It has been alleged that the different
outcomes were aligned with the different causes of the hacking and,
consequently, the merits of the cases. Clay Michael Gillespie, VeriCoin
Developer: “The NXT Chain Should Not Be Rolled Back”, CRYPTOCOIN NEWS
(Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/vericoin-developer-believenxt-chain-rolled-back/. Bitcoin itself forked in 2010 after someone minted
billions of bitcoins but, given that the network was still small, it was easily
handled without much difficulty. Id.
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takeovers or corporate control. Note that takeovers also often
end up redirecting and splitting the assets involved, so that the
takeover market also provides a discrete, competitive, marketled solution, alternative to the institutional, continuous, and
evolutionary decision-making provided by formal corporate
governance through, for example, corporate boards, proxy fights
and general shareholders’ meetings.70 (On the contrary, hard
forks launched to reverse an allegedly fraudulent transaction
may, at least sometimes, be closer to a bank bailout, especially
if developers, miners, and investors have close ties or are even
the same persons, so that they all share a vested interest in
reversing the transaction.)71
70. One may interpret from this governance perspective the concerns. See,
e.g., Kathleen Breitman, Why Ethereum’s Hard Fork Will Cause Problems in the
Coming Year, BITCOIN MAGAZINE (Feb. 3, 2017), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/
articles/op-ed-why-ethereums-hard-fork-will-cause-problems-coming-year/
(stating, in essence, “hard forks are not effective for evolutionary change”).
However, no doubt hard forks act as a disciplinary device for lead developers:
In a sense, the lead developers are leading the parade. They’re out in
front, marching, and the parade will generally follow them when they
turn a corner. But if they try to lead the march down a disastrous
route, then the parade members might decide to go in a different
direction. The lead developers can urge the community on, but they
don’t have formal power to force people to follow them if they take the
system in a technical direction that the community doesn’t like.
NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 171. How effective they may be in this
disciplinary task remains an open question. Most likely, as many market-driven
processes, competition among participants will be a major determinant of
overall efficiency. Similarly, as in the takeover market, collisions between
efficiency objectives and distributional concerns are bound to arise: positive
size-of-the-pie effects may well coexist with exploitation of the least-informed
participants. C.f., e.g., Gregg Jarrell & Michael Bradley, The Economic Effects
of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & ECON. 371,
373 (1980). Similarly, the distribution of value gains may affect the incentives
to launch hard-fork initiatives, in a similar manner to the effect that takeover
rules, e.g., sharing takeover premiums, have been claimed to exert on the
likelihood of takeovers. Id.
71. See Frances Coppola, A Painful Lesson for the Ethereum Community,
FORBES (July 21, 2016, 1:54 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola
/2016/07/21/a-painful-lesson-for-the-ethereum-community/#1b2f26cabb24
(“[T]he Ethereum central bank has directly recapitalized the DAO commercial
bank by monetizing its debts.”). The whole series of incidents also suggests that
Bitcoin may in fact be more “regulated” or at least “governed” than is sometimes
claimed. Contra, Gur Huberman, Jacob D. Leshno & Ciamac Moallemi,
Monopoly Without a Monopolist: An Economic Analysis of the Bitcoin Payment
System, BANK FIN. RES. DISCUSSION PAPERS 36 (Sept. 5, 2017), https://helda
.helsinki.fi/bof/bitstream/handle/123456789/14912/BoF_DP_1727.pdf.
To
understand its governance, one needs at least to consider the role played by code
developers and allegedly concentrated miners.
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B. CONTRACT COMPLETION IN SMART CONTRACTS
These cases teach some important general lessons.
Furthermore, being controversial, they show the tensions and
tradeoffs that the technology involves, which may be more
informative than the usual summary of business models so
common in the literature.
First, the tensions observed resemble the traditional conflict
between the blind and automatic application of formal legal
principles that should enable impersonal transactions and their
nuanced qualification through exceptions based on principles of
equity, good faith, or notice, which introduce a personal and
often even political element and, as a consequence, are more
suitable for personal exchange.72
Second, as in other attempts to enable impersonal exchange,
it makes sense to argue for contract simplicity. For instance, the
root of the DAO problem was that smart contracts face a tradeoff
between security and complexity,73 and the uncertain and
changing environment emphasizes the need for adaptation.
Furthermore, errors in computer code are prevalent and

72. This conflict is visible in this summary of the pros and cons involved in
the DAO incident:
Users that did not support the hard fork point out that: code is law—
the original statement of The DAO terms and conditions should stand
under any circumstances; things that happen on the blockchain are
immutable and they should never change regardless of what the
outcome is; there is a slippery slope and once you modify/censor for one
course/reason there is not a lot to keep you from doing it for other
contracts; the decision to return the money is short sighted and you
might reduce the value of ETH down the line based on your decision to
act now; [and], this is a bailout. Users that supported the hard fork
argued the code is law is too drastic of a statement at the current time
and humans should have the final say through social consensus; the
Hacker could not be allowed to profit from the exploit as it is ethically
wrong and the community should intervene; the slippery slope
argument is not valid as the community is not beholden to past
decisions, people can act rationally and fairly in each situation; it
would be problematic to leave such a big piece of the Ether supply in
the hands of a malicious actor and it might harm the value of Ether
down the line; this is not a bailout as you are not taking money from
the community, it is just a return of funds to the original investors; it
would stop an ongoing war between the white-hat hackers and the
hacker that would demoralize the community; the exploit was big
enough to take action and reverse it; [and], if the community acts now
it will make people that are unethical think twice before they use
Ethereum as their platform of choice.
What is Ethereum Classic, supra note 37 (punctuation modified by the author).
73. See Shea, supra note 39.
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impossible to eradicate, and they increase with complexity,74 as
with conventional contracts. Moreover, once a smart contract is
implemented, it is not under the control of its creator, unless the
power to change the code is allocated to a “master,” with obvious
centralization.75 Automatic contracts therefore need to use
simple computer code (some platforms meet this demand for
simplicity by running most of the logic off the chain and having
it upgraded by the majority of the parties76). A related point is
made by Abramowicz in terms of the judgment that may be
needed to “complete” contracts: “until computer programs can
exhibit general artificial intelligence, they will lack judgment.
They will not, for example, be able to determine whether vague
contract provisions have been satisfied. Cryptocurrencies cannot
solve the problem of incomplete contracts, and as long as
contracts are incomplete, humans will need to resolve
ambiguities.”77
The role of simplicity and the scope for ex ante completion
help to explain why blockchain seems to be gaining more ground

74. See Joshua Bloch, Extra, Extra—Read All About It: Nearly All Binary
Searches and Mergesorts are Broken, GOOGLE RES. BLOG (June 2, 2006), https://
research.googleblog.com/2006/06/extra-extra-read-all-about-it-nearly.html, for
an interesting example. It is said that “[o]n average, software comes with
between 15 and 50 defects per 1,000 lines of code.” Not-So-Clever Contracts,
supra note 37.
75. See Shea, supra note 39 (“[O]nce a smart contract is implemented, it
takes on a life of its own and the code cannot be changed unless it is created
with a ‘master’ or set of masters who can change the code.”).
76. For instance, in the case of Blockstack, by (1) “[encoding] minimal logic
on the blockchain,” which would “[o]nly define the parties involved in the
agreement and allow them to jointly hold assets and authorize transfers”; (2)
“[creating] a code agreement that all parties run off of the chain,” with
communication channels where parties can sign distribute, vote and upgrade
the code agreement; and, (3) “have the parties run code off of the chain . . . [and]
submit transfer requests” which go through when accepted by a majority of
parties running the code. Shea, supra note 39 (emphasis added). For further
development of the proposal, see Muneeb Ali & Ryan Shea, A Token Mechanism
for Growing the Blockstack Ecosystem of Decentralized Applications,
BLOCKSTACK TOKEN (Oct. 26, 2017), https://blockstack.com/tokenpaper.pdf.
77. Abramowicz, supra note 48, at 362 (citation omitted). On this basis,
Abramowicz argues that bitcoin is not really a system of peer-to-peer
governance. First, given its limited scope of decisions and, in particular, the fact
that such decisions involve no judgment: “It is an institution, however, that can
resolve only one type of decision: whether purported transfers of Bitcoins will
be validated and added to a list of approved transfers, known as the block
chain.” Id. at 361. Moreover, “[it] is coordinated in the same centralized manner
as other open source projects.” Id. at 367.
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in the financial world and, in particular, in such areas as
payments and even derivatives trading,78 which are already
quite standardized and in fact deal with legal commodities.
Obviously, contractual and property simplicity are negatively
correlated to the value of transactions: for low-value
transactions, complex contracts are too costly to write and
enforce, and low-value assets are not valuable enough to define
multiple rights on them. Understandably, blockchain and smart
contracts also develop more easily in low-value contexts.79
Lastly, blockchain clearly adds value by providing
verifiability on the content of contractual documents. However,
it is less clear to what extent or in which cases it is able to make
contractual performance verifiable by third parties or even make
verification unnecessary, except for very abstract and extremely
formalized contracts. Therefore, consequences of blockchains on
relational contracts are likely to be small, if by “relational” we
mean contracts that are completed by the parties ex post,
sometime in the future after they committed to the contract.80
The contract was left incomplete because it would have been
inefficient or even impossible to complete it. Verifiability of the
contractual content (where blockchain probably enjoys its
stronger comparative advantage) seems just a tiny element to
substantially affect these tradeoffs.
On the other hand, blockchains could seemingly have a
greater effect on the functioning of relational contracts, when by
“relational” we mean an exchange safeguarded by reputation or
the expectation of future trade gains, in a way the opposite of
impersonal exchange.81
78. See, e.g., INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N (ISDA), THE FUTURE OF
DERIVATIVES PROCESSING AND MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE 23 (2016),
https://www2.isda.org/attachment/ODcwMA==/Infrastructure%20white%20pa
per.pdf (arguing that blockchain holds great potential in the derivatives
industry and advising to develop mechanisms to designate blockchain records
as final as early in the transaction lifecycle as possible).
79. ALLENS LINKLATERS, supra note 30, at 14–15.
80. C.f. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985). In a sense,
Shea’s proposed code agreement would place the relational element outside the
blockchain. Ali & Shea, supra note 76.
81. C.f. Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in
Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 616 (1981)
(“[E]conomists . . . have long considered ‘reputations’ and brand names to be
private devices which provide incentives and assure contract performance in
the absence of any third-party enforcer”); Carl Shapiro, Premiums for High
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In this context, we must distinguish two types of blockchain
applications:
First, applications enabling business-business (B2B)
transactions could rely on “private” or “permissioned” systems,
which are open only to preapproved users and in which the
consensus may be driven by a previously established set of
nodes.82 In this vein, private blockchains should expand rapidly
in supply chain management, revamping the existing and mostly
closely-knit networks of suppliers, manufacturers, and
distributors, which are already characterized by phenomena
such as “contract manufacturing,”83 as well as “virtual
integration.”84 Financial institutions are pioneers in this
regard.85 However, from the perspective of blockchain, these
Quality Products as Returns to Reputations, 98 Q.J. ECON. 659, 659–60 (1983)
(“[R]eputation formation is a type of signaling activity . . . the faithful strategy
involves foregoing the opportunity to earn profits through quality reductions.”).
82. See Vitalik Buterin, On Public and Private Blockchains, ETHEREUM
BLOG (Aug. 7, 2015), https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/08/07/on-public-andprivate-blockchains/ (describing the comparative advantages of public and
private blockchains).
83. Benito Arruñada & Xosé Henrique Vázquez, When Your Contract
Manufacturer Becomes Your Competitor, HARV. BUS. REV. 135, Sept. 2006,
https://hbr.org/2006/09/when-your-contract-manufacturer-becomes-yourcompetitor. See also IBM INST. FOR BUS. VALUE, FAST FORWARD: RETHINKING
ENTERPRISES, ECOSYSTEMS AND ECONOMIES WITH BLOCKCHAINS (2016),
https://www-01.ibm.com/common/ssi/cgi-bin/ssialias?htmlfid=GBE03757USEN
(describing the effects of blockchain on organizational structure).
84. Benito Arruñada, The Quasi-Judicial Role of Large Retailers: An
Efficiency Hypothesis of Their Relation with Suppliers, in THE ECONOMICS OF
CONTRACTS: THEORIES AND APPLICATIONS 337 (Eric Brousseau & Jean-Michel
Glachant eds., 2002). A prominent example is that of Wal-Mart. See, e.g., Kim
S. Nash, Wal-Mart Turns to Blockchain for Tracking Pork in China, WALL ST.
J. (Oct. 19, 2016, 4:43 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2016/10/19/wal-mart-turnsto-blockchain-for-tracking-pork-in-china/.
85. According to the CEO of IBM, “Financial institutions are becoming
early adopters: The World Economic Forum estimates that 80% of banks are
working on blockchain projects.” Ginni Rometty, How Blockchain Will Change
Your Life: The Technology’s Potential Goes Way Beyond Finance, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 7, 2016, 7:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-blockchain-willchange-your-life-1478564751. “Having initially been sceptical [sic] about
[blockchain technology] because of worries over fraud, banks are now exploring
how they can exploit the technology to speed up back-office settlement systems
and free billions in capital tied up supporting trades on global markets.” Martin
Arnold, Big Banks Plan to Coin New Digital Currency: Group of Major Lenders
Seeks Industry Standard for Settlements, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2016), https://
www.ft.com/content/1a962c16-6952-11e6-ae5b-a7cc5dd5a28c. However, there
are more general initiatives such as MultiChain, which “helps organizations to
build and deploy blockchain applications with speed,” use managed
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systems will face a basic contradiction: the smaller the network,
the smaller the extent and the fewer the advantages of
decentralization, and the easier it may be to manipulate it.86
They may therefore end up with little decentralization, little
disruption, and even some risk of collusion among incumbents.
The advantage of blockchain in making the content of contracts
(as opposed to contractual performance) verifiable might make it
unsuitable for contracts which, on purpose, are not formalized in
order to ensure self-enforcement.87
Second, the comparative advantage of blockchain
applications would be considerably enhanced if the technology
fulfills its promise of enabling individual users to own and keep
full control of their historical record of transactional data, which
is now in the hands of third-party centralized data silos (such as
Google, Facebook or Booking). Availability and ownership of
transactional data would make it possible for individuals to,
first, accumulate reputational capital; and, then, deploy such
capital to safeguard their transactions across multiple markets
and relying on different applications. The system could benefit
from massive economies of scale and scope, and could achieve
secure personal transactions with anonymous parties, therefore
providing an effective alternative to impersonal (i.e., meaning
asset-based) exchange. Difficulties are numerous, however. For

permissions, which allows organizations to “[d]ynamically control who can
connect, send and receive transactions, create assets, streams and blocks.”
MULTICHAIN: OPEN SOURCE PRIVATE BLOCKCHAIN PLATFORM, http://www
.multichain.com/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2017). The chain is therefore “as open or
as closed as you need.” Id. The big question on private blockchain: What is its
comparative advantage with respect to existing systems for data management?
A preliminary answer rests on the additional capabilities provided by its peerto-peer distributed structure, which should at least reduce the risks inherent in
centralized control present even in vertically integrated structures due to
agency problems.
86. See, e.g., NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 34–38 (explaining a type
of blockchain manipulation and confirming the role of honest nodes in
preventing the success of a manipulation attempt).
87. See generally Gillian K. Hadfield & Iva Bozovic, Scaffolding: Using
Formal Contracts to Support Informal Relations in Support of Innovation, 5
WIS. L. REV. 981, 1019–32 (2016) (listing eighty-nine quotations from various
companies regarding their approach to certain aspects of agreements and
contracting). In Europe, this seems to affect even large recurrent transactions.
For instance, it has been common practice for some big retailers and their main
suppliers of consumer goods to write, but not sign, detailed and long contracts
to organize their continuous relationships—allegedly to impede judicial
interference (according to private conversations with practitioners).
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instance, reaching such economies without some type of
centralization, and—what may be the same—making the
necessary investments without any possibility of capturing
value in the future.
IV. BLOCKCHAIN AND PROPERTY, IN REM, RIGHTS
A. THE NEED FOR INTERFACES BETWEEN PERSONAL AND REAL
RIGHTS
One of the key attributes of a public ledger currency
platform is “a protocol for sending, receiving, and recording
value securely using cryptographic methods . . . .”88 A key
question is to what extent, in addition to exchanging value, these
systems are capable of exchanging property in rem rights.89
Exaggerated but conveniently imprecise claims are common—
for instance, one of the authors of the Walport Report asserted
that “[u]npermissioned ledgers can be used as a global record
that cannot be edited: for declaring a last will and testament, for
example, or assigning property ownership.”90
In fact, however, even most of the pioneer agents doing
simple transactions, such as trading in Bitcoin, rely at least on
intermediaries such as exchanges (digital marketplaces)91 and

88. David S. Evans, Economic Aspects of Bitcoin and Other Decentralized
Public-Ledger Currency Platforms 1 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 685, 2014), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi
/viewcontent.cgi?article=2349&context=law_and_economics.
89. Compare Merrill & Smith, supra note 3 (discussing various aspects and
criticisms of the numerus clausus principle, which holds that property rights
need to conform to a closed number of standardized forms), with Hansmann &
Kraakman, supra note 3 (disagreeing with Merrill and Smith’s analysis,
discussing requirements for the establishment of property rights, and setting
out conditions to be used in assessing the efficiency of alternative property
rights regimes).
90. Simon Taylor, Definitions, in DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY:
BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN, supra note 1, at 17 (emphasis added).
91. To users, they perform the same functions as banks (accept deposits in
exchange for a mere promise to return them later, make payments, exchange
electronic and fiat currencies, transfer funds, match clients, etc.) but also suffer
similar risks, including bank runs, Ponzi schemes, and hacks, which are the
electronic equivalent of break-ins. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 88–94.
Before 2013, exchanges had experienced a failure rate of forty-five percent
according to a study. Id. at 90. They also act as organized markets, in a similar
way to organized fiat currency exchanges, even if users can disintermediate
them to trade directly with other users. Id. at 99.
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wallets (digital storage services).92 Even if such intermediaries
have often been insecure,93 suffering frequent fraudulent
attacks,94 their presence is not necessarily bad.95 Even though,
as blockchain partisans rightly point out, specialized
enforcement and, in general, intermediation, entail agency costs,
they enjoy the advantages of specialization.96 Economic growth
is based on efficiently trading off specialization advantages and
agency costs.
In more complex blockchain applications, in which parties
trade claims on assets existing outside the blockchain ledger,
92. The importance of these interfaces can also be seen in the need for peerto-peer organizations and, in particular, banks, to own real assets in order to
develop a valuable reputation, and therefore to be recognized as a legal person:
The obstacle [of cryptocurrency banks], however, is solely a legal one:
a fully functional bank must be able to own real assets because a
primary function of a bank is to invest funds. A peer-to-peer institution
could own assets only if the legal system recognized the peer-to-peer
institution as legitimately existing and having a form of personhood
sufficient for the ownership of property. Real property purchased by a
trust, for example, might be held in the name of the public key or in
the name of the cryptocurrency as a whole.
Abramowicz, supra note 48, at 413.
93. For Bitcoin, the blockchain itself has been resilient but the wallets and
exchanges have not: “[U]sing hacker-proof bitcoin requires going through
intermediaries such as exchanges to convert real-world currency into cryptocash, and ‘wallets’ to store it. These have proved anything but secure, which
arguably defeats the purpose of bitcoin’s trust-free world.” Blockchain: The Next
Big Thing, THE ECONOMIST (May 9, 2015) [hereinafter Blockchain: The Next
Big Thing], http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21650295-or-itnext-big-thing. See also Jamie Redman, The Bitcoin Exchange Thefts You May
Have Forgotten, BITCOIN NEWS (Feb. 3, 2017), https://news.bitcoin.com/bitcoinexchange-thefts-forgotten/ (describing a subset of the approximately fifty most
important exchange thefts up to January 2017).
94. See Izabella Kaminska, Bitcoin Bitfinex Exchange Hacked: The
Unanswered Questions, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content
/1ea8baf8-5a11-11e6-8d05-4eaa66292c32 (discussing a recent bitcoin exchange
hack, listing a set of recent and significant thefts from bitcoin exchanges, and
mentioning frequency of high profile hacking incidents since 2009). This
supports the argument by Evans: “Current claims that public ledger platforms
can conduct financial transactions more efficiently ignore the inefficiencies
associated with the incentive and governance systems and the likely costs
associated with regulation of these platforms and complementary service
providers such as vaults, wallets, and exchanges.” Evans, supra note 88.
95. An obvious example of the value of intermediaries is that, without a
central administrator, blockchain systems are “unforgiving: there is no
helpdesk to reset a lost password . . . .” Blockchain: The Next Big Thing, supra
note 93.
96. See Evans, supra note 88 (mentioning the costs associated with
regulation and complementary services providers like exchanges).
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these interfaces between the digital and the real worlds
resemble the traditional interface between contractual (in
personam) and property (in rem) rights.97 With the exception of
systems purely based on possession, contracting property
requires at least one intermediary (a registry or a court) between
the world of mere claims (i.e., in personam rights) and the real
world of in rem rights.98 For example, in land law, two
contradictory chains of title deeds could survive for a long time,
but (1) at any point in time at most one individual is holding
possession of the claimed right on the specific real asset; (2) most
importantly, for upgrading one of the claims in a right with in
rem consequences, what is needed is a third-party enforcer
representing the interests of all potential rightholders and not
only the interests of those in the chain of title—a crucially
important aspect for blockchain applications.99 Note that, in a
97. The Cuber initiative involving an Estonian bank provides an example
of the in personam nature of the rights acquired by users with respect to the
intermediaries:
The bank [LHV] enters the color identities into the code of the
cryptocurrency Bitcoin. LHV guarantees the asset value of the
particular pieces of Bitcoin whomever owns them. In their case the
pieces of cryptocurrency represent Euro. When someone performs a
transaction in Euro in Cuber, the properties of the color-coded
cryptocurrencies are transferred so that they represent a Euro value
with a new owner. The value of the Bitcoin currency in this context is
completely uninteresting. The cryptocurrency is used as a way to store
information, and LHV determines what this information represents in
terms of value. This is not very different from the activity of a bank.
The bank is currently responsible for what the digital codes in their
databases represent in terms of value, which they also reconcile with
central banks, markets, and so forth.
KEMPE, supra note 24, at 19. See also CUBER, http://www.cuber.ee/en_US/ (last
visited Oct. 17, 2016) (Cuber home page).
98. See, e.g., Benito Arruñada, The Titling Role of Possession, in LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION 207, 211 (Yun-chien Chang ed., 2015) (discussing
judges’ possible adjudicatory approaches to a hypothetical property dispute
involving both in rem and in personam rights). See generally LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION (Yun-chien Chang ed., 2015) (presenting analyses
of various aspects of possession).
99. A pioneer developer of applications for land registries, Factom, put it
this way:
Bitcoin, land registries, and many other systems need to solve a
fundamental problem: proving a negative. They prove some “thing” has
been transferred to one person, and prove that thing hasn’t been
transferred to someone else. While proof of the negative is impossible
in an unbounded system, it is quite possible in a bounded system.
Cryptocurrencies solve this problem by limiting the places where
transactions can be found. Bitcoin transactions can only be found in
the Bitcoin blockchain. If a relevant transaction is not found in the
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sense, a chain of paper title deeds is also “virtual,” as it reflects
mere claims;100 therefore, if parties to the contract agree, it can
support trade without necessarily having any real effect in terms
of the traded assets that it purports to represent.
This account is consistent with analyses of blockchain
applications in “smart property” that use examples in which they
are in fact describing transfers of possession instead of transfers
of ownership—for instance, the running example of a “car whose
ownership is controlled through a block chain” used in chapter
eleven of Narayanan et al.,101 immediately turns out to be a
transfer of possession:
The block chain transaction doesn’t merely represent a change in
ownership of the car: it additionally transfers actual physical control
or possession of the car. When a car is transferred this way the earlier
owner’s key fob stops working and the new owner’s key fob gains the
ability to open the locks and start the engine. Equating ownership
with possession in this way has profound implications.102

The implications are indeed profound but they are achieved
by transforming ownership into possession—that is, by
enforcing only a single right in the asset. The price being paid is
huge: the modern economy is based on the specialization (or,
some would say, separation) of ownership and control (that is, in
its simplest sense, possession). If blockchain’s smart property is
limited to possessory rights, the word “merely” in the preceding
quotation should be excised and the word “additionally” replaced
by “only”. In practical terms, this limits stand-alone (no trusted
third parties) applications of smart property to low-value assets,

blockchain, it is defined from the Bitcoin protocol perspective not to
exist and thus the BTC hasn’t been sent twice (double spent).
FACTOM, BUSINESS PROCESSES SECURED BY IMMUTABLE AUDIT TRAILS ON THE
BLOCKCHAIN 5 (2014) (emphasis added), https://github.com/FactomProject
/FactomDocs/blob/master/Factom_Whitepaper.pdf?raw=true.
100. The “chain” in “blockchain” comes about from the fact that each block
is linked cryptographically to previous blocks. Jeremy Clark, Foreword to
NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 14, at XXI. This linkage resembles the links in
the chain of title deeds used to provide evidence on property transactions, but
in the case of title deeds there is a legal linkage between successive grantors
and grantees. In a sense, it is closer to the physical indenture of medieval
documents executed in two or more copies with edges correspondingly severed
as a means of identification.
101. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 272 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 274 (emphasis added).
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as Narayanan et al. themselves seem to conclude a few pages
later.103
In one respect, the decision system used by the blockchain
seems closer to the one applied in property law to real property
than to bank or cash money: blockchain decisions are based on
gathering users’ consents, and this may look similar to the
transfer of ownership in real property, where the consent of
rightholders is required to transfer in rem rights.104 If S
transfers to B a right held in rem by O, S may acquire an in
personam claim against B but does not in any way affect O’s
right. Similarly, transferring bitcoins requires a consensus of
verifiers to validate the hashes. (In contrast, in a bank transfer
it is only the banks involved who certify the transfer, while cash
changes hands by merely transferring the possession of the bills.
Cash transfers do not even leave a record: parties are constantly
solving the “who owns what” question without relying on a
formal “enforcement apparatus” except for the simple transfer of
possession. Bitcoin is similar to cash in also being a bearer
instrument,105 but with records and an element of consent.)
Nevertheless, there are two fundamental differences
between the systems for gathering consents in blockchain and
property. First, blockchain users are more like observing
spectators than rightholders; therefore, their incentives are not
necessarily well aligned. Second, not all rightholders in the real
assets are blockchain users; therefore, any purging procedure
would require additional mechanisms to ensure that the
interests of these rightholders are represented. In rem rights
require all rightholders to grant their consent, not only those
listed in a paper-based chain of title deeds or in the blockchain.

103. However, they are led to that conclusion more for the need of thirdparty human judgment to complete transactions:
The main advantage of smart property is the efficiency of ownership
transfer, which can be done from anywhere at any time. For sales of
items less valuable than a car (e.g., a smartphone or computer),
disputes are unlikely to end up in court, and so nothing is lost in that
regard. For such items, atomic transactions are a useful security
feature.
Id. at 284.
104. Benito Arruñada, Property Enforcement as Organized Consent, 19 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 401 (2003) [hereinafter Arruñada, Property Enforcement];
ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6.
105. Andreessen, supra note 16.

86

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 19:1

These are serious concerns when it is claimed that “any type
of asset can be transferred using the blockchain”.106 The legal
effects of such transfers, at least, would be limited to the
transferring parties.107 Indeed, property rights are in the sphere
of public ordering,108 and pure “privacy” is only viable when
parties trade in contractual claims.109 As this has obvious
welfare implications in terms of weaker enforcement,110 parties
understandably demand in rem rights. Meeting this demand
requires the intervention of a third party with a necessarily
public function, as it must be impartial to all and prevail over
the parties to any given contract.111 To start with, such a third
party is necessary to define the set of legal rightholders and the
mechanisms and evidentiary requirements for them to convey
their consent with respect to intended transactions. It is
revealing that blockchain initiatives often demand a more active
role from governments in setting standards than in essence such
a definition entails.112
These concerns are also echoed in the caveats often
introduced when foreseeing blockchain applications. For
example, a famous entrepreneur claimed that
Bitcoin gives us, for the first time, a way for one Internet user to
transfer a unique piece of digital property to another Internet user,
such that the transfer is guaranteed to be safe and secure, everyone
knows that the transfer has taken place, and nobody can challenge
the legitimacy of the transfer. The consequences of this breakthrough
are hard to overstate.113

Note, however, the “digital” adjective in the first sentence:
one cannot send real property over the Internet or, more
precisely, one cannot even transfer possession of real property
over the Internet. A somehow similar caveat is introduced by
Abramowicz when he considers the limitations of bitcoin:
[W]hat makes Bitcoin remarkable is that it settles the most
controversial issue—who owns wealth—without need for a law
106. The Great Chain of Being Sure About Things, supra note 14, at 20.
107. Abramowicz, supra note 48, at 365 (“Peer-to-peer law is most plausible
as a mechanism of voluntary private ordering.”).
108. Arruñada, Property as Sequential Exchange, supra note 4.
109. Id.; Arruñada, Coase and the Departure from Property, supra note 4.
110. ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 18–24.
111. Arruñada, Coase and the Departure from Property, supra note 4, at 305;
Arruñada, Property as Sequential Exchange, supra note 4.
112. See supra note 78 and accompanying text, on financial derivatives and
infra Section IV.B, on the registration of legal organizations.
113. Andreessen, supra note 16 (emphasis added).
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enforcement apparatus. Bitcoin can be seen not just as a currency, but
more grandly as an institution that creates and enforces property
rights. It is an institution, however, that can resolve only one type of
decision: whether purported transfers of Bitcoins will be validated and
added to a list of approved transfers, known as the block chain.114

Note that the implicit meaning of “property rights” in the
previous quotation is that of contract, in personam, rights. For
the same reason, it is understandable that enforcement of peerto-peer decision systems is easier when they deal with digital
resources being held in escrow. Not only the losing party is less
effective in preventing enforcement but courts are unlikely to
interfere because usually there are no claims by third parties.
B. OTHER INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
Additional aspects of blockchain can be enlightened by
specific elements of the theory of property, in rem, rights. First
is the distinction between initial and recurrent allocation of
rights, which is a requirement for in rem rights.115 Blockchain
discussion and initiatives are still too incipient to have suffered
from the general proclivity in conventional property titling and
administrative simplification to overemphasize the initial
allocation of property rights with little attention being paid to
their recurrent allocation.116 However, even in the implausible
scenario that recurrent allocation could be produced in a safer
manner within a blockchain-based technology, such a system
would require at least two public interventions in order, first, to
produce some sort of “first registration” (for property assets such
as land and companies subject to public titling; less so for those
others lacking it, such as diamonds); and, second, to define the
blockchain as the only or at least a privileged source of judicial
evidence for titling purposes.

114. Abramowicz, supra note 48, at 361 (emphasis added).
115. Benito Arruñada, Property as an Economic Concept: Reconciling Legal
and Economic Conceptions of Property Rights in a Coasean Framework, 59 INT’L
REV. ECON. 121 (2012). In particular,
property, in rem, rights are only transacted in a two-step procedure
which includes a first step corresponding to the conventional private
contracting between the parties, with effects of an in personam nature;
and a second, relatively “public,” step which is capable of granting
universal in rem effects because public authorities more or less
explicitly represent the interests of all interested parties.
Arruñada, Coase and the Departure from Property, supra note 4, at 313.
116. Arruñada, Property as Sequential Exchange, supra note 4.
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In contrast, blockchain applications do follow the path of
common efforts in property titling and administrative
simplification in “paying scant attention to legal rights,”117
despite this being the main determinant of enforceability and,
therefore, economic value. This bias is highly visible in the
diagnoses of traditional systems by blockchain entrepreneurs
trying to apply the technology in the area of property titling,
whose policy failures they narrowly attribute to poor data
management; e.g., “[t]he failure of [traditional property registry
software projects] to effect change can be traced to design flaws
that ultimately leave them opaque to would be auditors while
making the information they store overly pliable.”118 However,
in reality, the main problem of property registries is not
archiving information, but producing reliable information. That
is, it is not a problem of keeping a record of perfectly “purged”
property rights, but purging them and making sure that
transactions are not contradictory with preexisting property
rights and do not create new collisions of claims.119 Despite the
fact that this is mainly a legal issue, not a technological issue,
blockchain applications in property registration focus instead on
archiving and on keeping the integrity of the information,
disregarding how the information is produced and, especially,
the whole process of how property rights are purged of
contradictions. Moreover, if this purging is something for which
blockchain is perhaps of little use,120 claims on the potential of
the technology in this area should be substantially diluted.121
117. Id. at 3; see also id. at 20–24.
118. Dobhal Abhishek & Matthew Regan, Immutability & Auditability: The
Critical Elements in Property Rights Registries 3 (2016) (paper prepared for
presentation at the 2016 World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty).
119. For example, saying that “many of the potential benefits of utilizing the
blockchain [for ‘land administration’] assume that a base layer of land
information (titles, deeds, survey plans) exist and that the data is accurate”
(Anand Aanchal, Matthew McKibbin, & Frank Pichel, Colored Coins: Bitcoin,
Blockchain, and Land Administration 13 (2016) (draft of paper prepared for
presentation at the 2016 World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty)) comes
close to assuming perfect information and seems, for the reason given in the
text, inadequate.
120. As seemingly recognized when asserting that “[b]lockchain will not help
to identify who has what right and to where. It will not resolve property rights
disputes as properties are brought into the formal system. Most importantly it
won’t resolve the tedious and time consuming process of collecting, verifying
and bringing data into the system.” Id. at 3.
121. This may help to explain why projects stall soon after big and seemingly
exaggerated announcements; for example, Honduras. Pete Rizzo, Blockchain
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A similar criticism is deserved by the Swedish inter-agency
initiative to apply the blockchain to land conveyancing and
registration, which considered that the main problems of the
current Swedish Land Register were:
that Lantmäteriet [Sweden’s land registry] is only involved in a few
steps at the end of the real estate transactions. As a consequence of
this the majority of the process is not transparent, in other words,
visible to the public or other stakeholders. . . . that the system is slow
at registering real estate transactions. The time between the signing
a legally binding purchasing con-tract [sic] and when Lantmäteriet
receives the bill of sale and make the approval of the title is often three
to six months. . . . [and] that the issues above have resulted in sellers,
buyers, banks and real estate agents being forced to create their own
complex, red tape, processes for agreements between them since they
have to make sure that things can’t go wrong, and because the value
of the transactions is large.122

However, these three points in fact deserve serious
qualifications.
First, it is not fully true that land registries are “involved in
a few steps at the end of the real estate transactions”123 because
they provide crucial information on possible conflicting claims
from the beginning and during the whole contracting path. For
instance, in step three of the conventional conveyancing process
described by Kempe, the Swedish real estate “agent contacts
Lantmäteriet and orders an excerpt from the real estate registry
database in order to check the information about the property,
i.e. that the seller is in fact the owner and can sell the
property.”124 Similar contacts are made in steps ten and twentyone, before signing the purchasing contract and before the
closing “to ensure that there aren’t any problems that would
prevent the sale of the property,”125 and further contacts are
made by banks in connection with mortgages at steps twentyfive and twenty-seven.126 Moreover, there are costs and benefits
Land Title Project ‘Stalls’ in Honduras, COINDESK (Dec. 26, 2015, 3:31 PM),
http://www.coindesk.com/debate-factom-land-title-honduras/. An anonymous
commentator to Rizzo put this sharply in focus: “This is an example of some
startup getting way ahead of themselves and declaring that just because they
were talking to some government officials that made it ‘a deal with the
Honduras government’. It’s like when startups have a bank account and then
list the bank as their ‘partner.’” Id.
122. KEMPE, supra note 24, at 8–9.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 23.
125. Id. at 24.
126. Id. at 25.
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associated with transparency. The tradeoff cannot always be
assumed to be necessarily positive.
Second, the typical complaint that the systems are “slow at
registering real estate transactions”127 must be taken with a
grain of salt, as most of the total time spent during the
conveyancing of real estate is usually dedicated by parties to
activities such as advertising, bargaining, surveying and
inspecting properties, checking borrowers’ creditworthiness,
etc.,128 activities that have little to do with the bureaucratic
processes themselves. Consequently, two doubts emerge about,
first, the time that is really spent in the bureaucratic steps that
could therefore be shortened by the application of blockchain or
other similar technologies; and, second, the economic value of
such time savings. In other terms: for most transactions,
shortening the time may have little value, especially when
parties with an urgent need can effectively process the
transaction in a much shorter time period.
Lastly, it is an empirical question how much security is in
fact provided by alternative systems, blockchain included,
especially at the beginning. New systems always need a learning
period for their weaknesses to be revealed, while old systems
offer the advantage of having accumulated such knowledge over
millions of previous transactions.
V. ASSESSING BLOCKCHAIN APPLICATIONS IN
PROPERTY
The previous analysis provides a basis for ascertaining the
potential of blockchain technology and building predictions
about the areas of contractual and property transactions that
will be most hospitable for blockchain applications, their
expected impact, and any circumstances that may hinder or
enable their development.
I will now discuss the major issues in the area of property,
broadly defined in order to cover the comparative advantage of
different types of intermediaries and solutions, including the
limitations and opportunities in the areas of property
conveyancing and deed recordation, as well as company and
property registration.

127. Id. at 8.
128. See, e.g., id. at 23–25.
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For a start, three cautionary notes are in order. First,
remember the above-mentioned social element in property
rights. Even Nick Szabo seems to be contemplating in personam
rights when implementing his idea of property clubs: “Actually
getting end users to respect the property rights agreed upon by
this system will be dependent on the specific nature of the
property, and is beyond the scope of the current inquiry.”129
Certainly, he immediately asserts that “[t]he purpose of the
replicated database is simply to securely agree on who owns
what,”130 and this “securely agree” is essential to move from in
personam to in rem.
Second, decentralization is limited in the real world because
individuals tend to misbehave with respect to security:
We were able to achieve decentralization only because we equated
possession with ownership—owning a car [the asset being taken by
the authors as a running example] is essentially equivalent to
knowing the private key corresponding to a designated transaction on
a block chain . . . . If we reduce ownership to the problem of securing
private keys, it raises the stakes for digital security, which is a
difficult problem with humans being a weak link. Programmers have
endeavored to write bug-free code for decades, but the challenge
remains elusive. Designers of cryptosystems have tried for decades to
get non-technical users to utilize and manage private keys in a way
that resists both theft and accidental loss of keys, also with little
progress. If the model of decentralization relies excessively on private
keys, cars might get stolen by malware or in phishing attacks, and the
loss of a key might turn your car into a giant brick. While there could
be fallback mechanisms to cover these types of events, inevitably such
mechanisms tend to lead us back toward intermediaries and
centralized systems, chipping away at the benefits of the
decentralized model that we were striving for.131

This issue is present in all types of applications, but,
understandably, it especially constrains those in which the
stakes are higher, leading people to demand greater security.
Lastly, misbehavior with respect to security is only an
instance of a broader and deeper phenomenon: individual
freedom has a price in terms of individual responsibility that not
all individuals are always willing to pay. Instead, knowing their
own weaknesses, they often trust more and prefer to rely on

129. Nick Szabo, Secure Property Titles with Owner Authority, http://www
.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwi
nterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/securetitle.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2017).
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 283.
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centralized solutions based on private and public custodian
agents.132 This preference for third-party custodians imposes a
particularly serious constraint on property applications because
the universal nature of property requires that the same rules be
applied to all rightholders. In a hypothetical, fully-decentralized
property system, all individuals would therefore be granting or
denying their consent to all sorts of intended transactions that
might affect their property rights. Consequently, they would
become the only custodians not only of their cryptographic keys
(to receive notice and grant consent) but also of the legal
integrity of their rights.
A. CONVEYANCING AND PROPERTY TITLING
The impact of the blockchain on conveyancing and property
titling will be affected by the basic characteristics of both legal
processes, which, in line with the incentives of participants, are
mostly private in conveyancing and intrinsically public in
registration.133 In particular, they are defined by the fact that in
all property systems parties are free to choose their lawyers,
conveyers, and notaries public.134 On the contrary, third-party
protection leads the law to universally restrict their choice of the
office that records their titles or the registrar that preserves and
reviews their rights, as well as the judge who presides over a suit
of quiet title or any equivalent judicial procedure.135 Therefore,
blockchain should find it easier to expand into notarization and
data archiving,136 but will find it more difficult to replace
centralized land registries, especially in jurisdictions such as
Australia, England, Germany and Spain that have registries of
132. Note that this option makes considerably more sense under realistic
behavioral assumptions, while the game-theory analyses applied to developing
blockchains often assume perfect rationality, which, when applied out of
context, may easily lead to unjustified enthusiasm.
133. Arruñada, Property Enforcement, supra note 104, at 423–24.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 424–28.
136. Indeed, “distributed ledgers naturally lend themselves to implementing
high-level services that involve notaries, time-stamping, and high-integrity
archiving, and promise to lower the costs of these activities by increasing
automation, enabling easy switching of service providers, and peer
transactions.” U.K. GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., DISTRIBUTED LEDGER
TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN 8 (2016), supra note 1, at 47. Note,
however, that conveyancing, notarization, and data archiving are already partly
decentralized, because they do not generally rely on central operators but on
independent professionals’ and parties’ databases.
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rights, also often called “land registration” or “title by
registration” systems.137
First, to the extent that even in civil law jurisdictions
notaries public are freely chosen by parties to private contracts,
the blockchain will likely play a bigger role in notarization, even
in real estate transactions.138 The only functions for which
notaries used to be clearly superior were for identifying parties
and, more clearly, for ascertaining their legal capacity and
serving as providers of settlement, closing, and escrow services
for the parties.139 These advantages, which for decades now have
been under threat from complementary technological
developments in identification and the related availability of
registries for individuals’ legal capacities, are now substantially
affected by blockchain, as it has allowed the development of
services that provide authentication and authorization, proving
to other parties that you are who you say (authentication) and
that you have the required permissions (authorization).140
137. For an analysis of the different types of land registries, see Arruñada,
Property Enforcement, supra note 104, at 406–23.
138. See, for instance, in regard to the initiative being developed in the
Republic of Georgia, Giulio Prisco, BitFury Announces Blockchain Land Titling
Project with the Republic of Georgia and Economist Hernando De Soto, BITCOIN
MAGAZINE (April 27, 2016, 10:56 AM), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles
/bitfury-announces-blockchain-land-titling-project-with-the-republic-ofgeorgia-and-economist-hernando-de-soto-1461769012/.
139. Benito Arruñada, Market and Institutional Determinants in the
Regulation of Conveyancers, 23 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 93 (2007), argues that even
civil law notaries face insurmountable difficulties to effectively review the
legality of private contracts, providing a uniform quality of review. The main
reason is that third parties, not being party to such contracts, do not influence
the choice of notary. Even where notaries are organized as a closed shop, free
choice of notary by parties introduces competition among them and,
consequently, the actual level of review is that of the weakest link in the whole
network of notaries, as shown by the lower quality and increased fraud observed
after the liberalization of notaries in The Netherlands. Francien Lankhorst &
Hans Nelen, Professional Services and Organised Crime in the Netherlands, 42
CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 163, 169–72 (2005).
140. For a nuanced analysis of the authentication and authorization
requirements, specifically developed to compare legacy and electronic
conveyancing and titling systems, see Rod Thomas et al., Australasian Torrens
Automation, Its Integrity, and the Three Proof Requirements, 2013 N.Z. L. REV.
227 (2013) and Rod Thomas et al., Designing an Automated Torrens System —
Baseline Criteria, Risks and Possible Outcomes, 2015 N.Z. L. REV. 425 (2015).
For an application to blockchain, see also Rod Thomas & Charlie Huang,
Blockchain, the Borg Collective and Digitalisation of Land Registries, 2017
CONV. 14 (2017). The case of the Estonian government is particularly
interesting:
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Likewise, with respect to settlement, trade implemented
through a blockchain can now provide conditioned simultaneous
enforcement by using the principle of “atomicity,” which, in
essence, ensures that both parties fulfill their promises at the
same time.141
Second, the applicability to registries of a truly
decentralized blockchain (i.e., without trusted intermediaries)
will be more limited because they play a public legal function,
protecting the interests of unrepresented third parties and

Since 2013, Estonian government registers — including those hosting
all citizen and business-related information — have used Guardtime
to authenticate the data in its databases. Their Keyless Signature
Infrastructure (KSI) pairs cryptographic “hash functions” (see below)
with a distributed ledger, allowing the Estonian government to
guarantee a record of the state of any component within the network
and data stores. . . .Using their ID card, citizens order prescriptions,
vote, bank online, review their children’s school records, apply for state
benefits, file their tax return, submit planning applications, upload
their will, apply to serve in the armed forces, and fulfill around 3000
other functions. . . . So how does a block chain help? It helps because
every alteration of a piece of data is recorded. By providing proof of
time, identity and authenticity, KSI signatures offer data integrity,
backdating protection and verifiable guarantees that data has not been
tampered with. It is transparent and works to the user’s benefit too:
citizens can see who reviewed their data, why, and when; and any
alterations to their personal data must be authorised. Moreover,
through using hash functions, as opposed to asymmetric cryptography
used in most PKI, KSI cannot be broken by quantum algorithms. It is
also so scalable that it can sign an exabyte of data per second using
negligible computational and network overhead. It removes the need
for a trusted authority, its signed data can be verified across
geographies, and it never compromises privacy[.]
Alastair Brockbank, Case Study – Estonian Block Chains Transform Paying,
Trading and Signing, in U.K. GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., DISTRIBUTED LEDGER
TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN, supra note 1, at 83.
141. This works in a similar manner to close a transaction:
As long as the currency used for payment and the car ownership co‐
exist on the same block chain, Alice and Bob can form a single atomic
transaction that simultaneously transfers ownership of the car and the
payment for the car. Specifically, the transaction would specify two
inputs: Alice’s ownership and Bob’s payment; and specify two outputs:
the ownership to Bob and the payment to Alice. The transaction
requires both parties to sign because both are providing inputs. If one
signs and the other does not, the transaction is not valid. Once one
party signs, the transaction details cannot be changed without
invalidating the signature. Once the signed transaction is broadcast to
the block chain, the car will wait for a preset number of confirmations
(e.g., six) and then allow Bob access. Simultaneously, Bob’s payment
to Alice will be confirmed. One cannot happen without the other.
NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 274.
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therefore being much more than mere public databases.142
Centralization and monopoly in registries are not rooted mainly
in economies of scale but in the enhanced neutrality (not only
with respect to parties to the contract but also with respect to
strangers to it) required to reach universal legal effects.143
However, this does not preclude that smart contracts could be
complementary to property and company registries in many
ways. For instance, property registries would be affected by the
ability of applications such as Ethereum not only to register and
track property but also to define new types of property
entitlements, including multiple ownership claims and assetsharing with sophisticated and nuanced allocations of use rights.
In principle, moreover, when considering the impact of
blockchain on property registries, it is sensible to at least
distinguish between recorders of deeds, such as those of France
or the USA, and registers of rights, such as the German
Grundbuch or the Torrens system of title by registration
operating in Australia.144 The latter not only date and keep the
documents or “deeds” reflecting the transactions that the
contractual parties agree to but also verify, as a necessary
condition for entry into the register, that the intended
transactions respect all other rightholders’ rights on the specific
asset.145

142. Describing a land registry as a ledger is somehow misleading. Land
registries are not standard ledgers. Systems based on the recordation of deeds
merely time-stamp and archive documents and are therefore closer to a simple
ledger. They are also similar to blockchains in that, in principle, they keep a
record of the whole history of transactions, without purging possible
contradictions. However, the date of entry at the registry holds crucial legal
consequences, allowing the record to provide evidence on the priority of legal
claims. Registries of rights are even more complex: they provide a sort of legal
“balance sheet” defining not mere personal claims but the socially-accepted
rights on a specific property. The “ledger” terminology focuses on the numeric
or accounting personal aspect, while the key element in registries is social and
legal: they do not mainly contain magnitudes (values) but the socially-accepted
legal evidence supporting claims (recording) or even establishing rights
(registration). If careful attention is not paid to this issue, attempts to apply
blockchain in this area easily fall prey of the GIGO (that is, “garbage in, garbage
out”) principle. See, as an example, the account of the failed proposal to reform
the land register of Honduras by Factom, provided by TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT,
supra note 14, at 193–95. See also Rizzo, supra note 121.
143. See, e.g., TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 14, at 194.
144. ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 55–67.
145. Id.
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It is conceivable that a deed recordation system might be
replaceable by an automatic system of dating private contracts
and preserving their contents, if parties to private contracts
cannot manipulate both functions once they sign their contract.
However, even in that case, there is still a need for the law to
establish the rules of evidence: to set the value of the blockchain
as a source of evidence for in rem adjudication. For a blockchain
to produce in rem effects, all parties must be obliged to express
their will through it. Moreover, the law must trust those
designing, putting in place, and—to some extent—governing, or
at least affecting, the government of the blockchain system.
The official report of the pilot project carried out in Cook
County (Chicago, Illinois) concurs with this analysis,146 as it
concludes that relying on an unpermissioned peer-to peer system
would be too costly in terms of energy and would force most
owners to rely on third parties,147 seemingly inclining the report
towards permissioned systems and to emphasize the use of
blockchain for conveyance and lodging, but retaining the
existing legal framework according to which “the county
146. See KAREN A. YARBROUGH, COOK COUNTY RECORDER OF DEEDS,
BLOCKCHAIN PILOT PROGRAM FINAL REPORT 32–34 (2017), http://cookrecorder
.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Final-Report-CCRD-Blockchain-PilotProgram-for-web.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2017). The firm developing the
system seems more optimistic: Ragnar Lifthrasir, Permissionless Real Estate
Title Transfers on the Bitcoin Blockchain in the USA! — Cook County
Blockchain Pilot Program Report, MEDIUM (Jun. 28, 2017), https://medium.com
/@RagnarLifthrasir/permissionless-real-estate-title-transfers-on-the-bitcoinblockchain-in-the-usa-5d9c39139292. A similar pilot, also limited to
conveyancing, is reported by Matt Snow, How I Sold 5 Acres of Land Using
BitBay’s Blockchain Smart-Contracts, MEDIUM (Oct. 19, 2017), https://medium
.com/@tradersnow/how-i-sold-5-acres-of-land-using-bitbays-trustless-smartcontracts-28f18b83125.
147. The report agrees with our previous judgment that insufficient
individual responsibility in preserving cryptographic keys would lead to
reliance on trusted third parties:
The Colored Coins (tokenization) approach seems to be a secure
method for transmitting information, but it is complicated and
requires users to become highly educated on how the technology works,
including extremely secure and encrypted means for storing the
private keys. Though securing a real estate transaction behind a
password or private key would be a great way to prevent unauthorized
transfers of property, it is not a stretch to imagine that such a system,
if it required token reuse, would result in more people losing their
private keys and requiring (another) third party to sell them back their
key or perform a recovery action in a multi-signature transaction (e.g.,
2 of 3 keys needed to sign).
YARBROUGH, supra note 146, at 33.

2018]

BLOCKCHAIN’S STRUGGLE

97

government record is the only official record.”148 In a similarly
minimalistic vein, it considers that “tokenizing” title would pose
substantial new legal challenges149 and using digital signatures
would facilitate secrecy and endanger the identification of
participants.150 Moreover, most of the positive aspects
highlighted by the report are not exclusive of blockchain, such
as the possibility of combining conveyance and recordation into
a single event, using separate components of blockchain
components to improve current recordkeeping practice (in
particular, Cook County has decided to add file hashing and data
integrity certification), consolidating property information
currently spread across several government offices in a single
website, and making fraud harder by protecting conveyances
with cryptographic keys.151
Blockchain may also lower the costs of identifying rights and
assets, making new types of registers viable, enabling finelytuned solutions for more detailed rights in intellectual property
and completely new registries for certain high-value assets, as
suggested by the Everledger initiative for registering diamonds
and other specially valuable assets.152 Note in this regard that
private ordering arrangements enjoy an advantage when rights
are unenforceable in rem, as with assets that are “easily
portable, universally valuable and virtually untraceable,” such
as diamonds, which explains why the diamond industry has been
based on a “millennia-old distribution system that relied on
multiple layers of personal exchange.”153 Blockchain would alter
this advantage if it is capable of relaxing this constraint, so that
it becomes economically viable to identify each individual asset,

148. Id. at 22 (emphasis in original).
149. Id. at 39–40.
150. Id. at 38–39.
151. Id. at 34–38.
152. Natasha Lomas, Everledger Is Using Blockchain to Combat Fraud,
Starting with Diamonds, TECHCRUNCH (June 29, 2015), https://techcrunch.com
/2015/06/29/everledger/.
153. Barak D. Richman, Ethnic Networks, Extralegal Certainty, and
Globalisation: Peering into the Diamond Industry, in CONTRACTUAL CERTAINTY
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND THEORETICAL DEBATES ON
INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC EXCHANGES 31, 32 (Volkmar
Gessner ed., 2009).
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this being one of the stated objectives of the Everledger
registry.154
B. COMPANY REGISTRATION
The case of company registries is similar to that of
recordation of deeds, to the extent that most company registries
are closer to recordation than to registration systems. However,
company registries could be challenged by initiatives like the
Ethereum blockchain, as these aim to create virtual
decentralized and autonomous organizations that would be
defined only by a given set of rules running in the blockchain. In
principle, these organizations can be flexibly organized,
allocating specialized managerial and contractual functions in
different manners.155 However, a historical perspective throws
light on the potential contribution and likely difficulties of this
contractual approach to company incorporation. The experience
of the English “unincorporated companies” prior to the creation
of the English Company Registry in 1844 provides relevant
insights.156 In general terms, they suggest that, even assuming
perfect immutability of the blockchain, the explicit backing of
the law and judicial rulings seem indispensable to avoid future
conflict ex post and to provide parties with the necessary
certainty ex ante.
A less ambitious initiative is the development of an
international standard for the identification of legal entities,
known as the Register of Legal Organizations (ROLO).157 It is
revealing that, despite being led by collaborative industry, given
that most transactions are business-to-business (B2B), what is
154. Lomas, supra note 152; see also U.K. GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI.,
DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN 8 (2016), supra
note 1, at 56.
155. C.f. Abramowicz, supra note 48, at 414 (“The traditional forms of
business association differ in how they allocate ownership interests and
decision-making authority, but the peer-to-peer business association allocates
decision-making authority in a new way—not to a specific owner, to partners,
to a board, or even to shareholders, but to the peer-to-peer decision-makers as
a whole.”).
156. See generally RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW (2000), for
the historical evidence. For an interpretation along the lines of the text, see
Benito Arruñada, Institutional Support of the Firm: A Theory of Business
Registries, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 525, 558–62 (2010).
157. See Andrew Coakley, The Block Chain Network: Accelerating Adoption,
SOPRA STERIA
5
(2016),
http://www.slideshare.net/AndrewCoakley1/
blockchain-final-25112015-v11.
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being considered is the need for ROLO “in each nation,”158 and
the expected presence of a mandatory element. In particular,
“enrolling into a ROLO at a Level of Assurance is voluntary;
however, being in ROLO will become mandatory for future high
assurance identity federation, cyber assurance and insurance
requirements. It can also be expected to become mandatory for
government contractors and companies in a number of regulated
sectors.”159 In England, it has the support of Companies House,
the English company register.160
Blockchain implications are clearer in other corporate areas
that are intrinsically contractual. For instance, blockchain has
the potential to automatize transactions in the area of “corporate
actions”: any announcements made by a public company
affecting its securities and which may require an action by either
investors or their representative agents. Examples include
dividends and coupon payments, offers to issue or redeem
securities,161 stock splits, mergers, and spin offs. Most of this
data is communicated to investors through a complex channel
involving suppliers of financial data, securities’ custodians, and
investment fund managers, who then also carry investors’
decisions in the opposite direction.162 In both directions,
blockchain could make the whole process much more efficient
and automatic.163

158. Id.
159. Id. at 6.
160. Id. (“ROLO’s design is being industry led and has gained some early
support from a wide range of industries, including those already covered by
Companies House (including Companies House itself).”).
161. Trading shares on a blockchain is legal in Delaware since July 2017.
Michael del Castillo, Delaware House Passes Historic Blockchain Regulation,
COINDESK (July 1, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/delaware-house-passeshistoric-blockchain-regulation/.
162. On the considerable costs and risks, both actual and potential, of these
systems, see the report sponsored by the Depository Trust & Clearing
Corporation and produced by Oxera. Corporate Action Processing: What Are the
Risks?, OXERA i–ii (2004), http://www.oxera.com/Oxera/media/Oxera/
downloads/reports/Corporate-action-processing.pdf?ext=.pdf (estimating at one
million the number of corporate actions worldwide, and further estimating the
annual risk at between 1.6 and 8 billion Euros and annual actual losses at
between 300 and 400 million Euros).
163. See Dominic Hobson, Case Study 2 — Corporate Actions, in
DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN, supra note 1, at
58–59 (“In theory, [blockchain technology] could eliminate all intermediaries
between the issuer and the fund manager, guaranteeing the accuracy and
timeliness of the information.”).
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C. PROPERTY REGISTRATION
All registries of rights (often called “title” or simply
“registration” systems) include a registry of documents in the
form of their lodgment book, which they use to establish
priorities before undergoing registration review. What has
already been said about recordation systems applies to this part
of registration systems.
In addition, in comparison with property recordation and
company registries, property registries of rights should be less
affected by blockchain, to the extent that registration review
cannot be easily exercised by an automatic system (even a
centralized one): it would be facing similar difficulties to those
considered above with respect to contractual completion. The
standard historical solution when creating modern land
registries has been to reduce the variety of rights enforceable in
rem, defining a smaller and closed number of in rem rights (the
“numerus clausus” principle),164 and to make property
transactions more “abstract” (i.e., formal). This simplification of
property rights is worthwhile to the extent that it makes it
possible for registries of rights to function or, in general, reduces
information asymmetries in markets.165 However, it may also be
costly because a smaller set of rights benefits from the
advantages of being enforced in rem. In this vein, the proposal
to have part of the transaction “out of the blockchain” (as in
Blockstack’s simple contracts, described in note 76) might end
up creating a two-step transacting process broadly similar to the
separation between the “causal” and “abstract” stages present in
many legal systems but most clearly established in German
property law.166

164. See generally Merrill & Smith, supra note 3; Hansmann & Kraakman,
supra note 3; Arruñada, Property Enforcement, supra note 104.
165. For an empirical test of the role of the numerus clausus in different
types of registries, see Arruñada, Property Enforcement, supra note 104, at 416–
23.
166. See Jürgen Kohler, The Law of Rights in Rem, in INTRODUCTION TO
GERMAN LAW 227, 231 (Werner Ebke & Matthew W. Finkin eds., 1996)
(describing how the principle of abstraction or Abstraktionsprinzip that is
characteristic of German property law makes transactions concerning property
rights formal and abstract, and showing how transactions take place by entry
into the land register or Grundbuch and are valid irrespective of the validity of
the causal obligation); see also Off-Chain Transactions, BITCOIN WIKI,
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Off-Chain_Transactions (last visited Oct. 12, 2017)
(explaining that the separation between on-chain and off-chain transactions—
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Moreover, in a fully decentralized system of property, all
individuals would take care of their rights by themselves, as the
rules of evidence used to establish title need to be the same for
all parties holding rights in that type of asset. They would need
to keep their cryptographic keys and to decide about any
transaction that other individuals propose which might affect
their rights. As mentioned previously, many individuals,
probably the majority, prefer to rely, at least partly, on trusted
private and institutional intermediaries.
Proposals to apply blockchain in the registration of real
property confirm this analysis. For instance, the abovementioned Swedish White Paper provides a valuable illustration
as, in essence, it is limited to reorganizing the in personam
contractual process precedent to the in rem property
transaction. The changes proposed in Sweden thus resemble the
“Landonline” system of electronic conveyancing and registration
implemented in New Zealand since 2009,167 but with a key
difference: the Swedish Land Register would at least initially
retain all its powers to review and decide on registration: “In an
initial stage, the database of Lantmäteriet remains intact.
Updates to the land registry are retrieved from the blockchain
and are then also checked by Lantmäteriet. Registration in the
blockchain is digital and based on the legal requirements, which
minimizes errors in the information.”168 Moreover, the land
used to speed them up, save fees and scale systems more easily—can be
interpreted in this vein).
167. The changes proposed in Sweden are summarized at KEMPE, supra note
24, at 27–31. See also Alex Mizrahi, A Blockchain-Based Property Ownership
Recording System, CHROMAWAY, 2016, http://chromaway.com/papers/Ablockchain-based-property-registry.pdf
(discussing
the
challenges
of
“implementation of blockchain-bnased [sic] property ownership recording
system[s]”); Blockchain and Future House Purchases: Second Phase Completed
in March 2017, CHROMAWAY, http://chromaway.com/landregistry/ (last visited
Oct. 27, 2016) (providing an interactive demonstration of a property purchase
using blockchain technology). For a description and analysis of the New Zealand
case, see Benito Arruñada, Leaky Title Syndrome?, 2010 N.Z. L.J. 115 (Apr.
2010). For a more general discussion of electronic conveyance see ARRUÑADA,
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 208–15.
168. KEMPE, supra note 24, at 33. As imagined, the interaction of the
blockchain with the land registry would be minimal:
The blockchain for the transactions is open source and is checked by
Lantmäteriet, but can be verified by anybody. The chain of
authorization, signing with a Telia ID, etc. can be edited. The
blockchain saves the verification records of documents such as the bill
of sale and the purchasing contract. Storing the original documents
and their verification records can be performed by an external party,
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register also defines the assets and (supposedly) the authority to
deal:
A central part of the practical application of blockchains is the
identification of what the digital codes will represent in the physical
world. As described above, it is LHV Bank, Lantmäteriet or someone
else behind a solution that is the organization that determines what
the digital codes represent and who is authorized to transfer or act in
a contracts [sic]. In other words, Lantmäteriet guarantees which
digital representation a specific property has.169

Therefore, the only substantial change proposed in the
White Paper seems to be the development of a seemingly private
blockchain application for electronic conveyance, which would
make it possible for all parties involved to work with the same
information, expanding their knowledge and reducing
duplications and mistakes.170 A benefit would be that, through
the application, all parties would also have instant access to any
filing in the register that may affect the legal standing of the
rights being traded.171
On the other hand, the system is planned to work with
“pending property titles” during the whole conveyance process
until eventual registration, which the White Paper hopes would
always be granted by its assumption that registration refusals
are now mainly caused by bureaucratic mistakes: “The risk that
but can also be stored digitally by each party in the agreement, the
bank, buyer, seller, agent, etc. The documents and verification records
are then stored in multiple locations, which creates redundancy. The
verification records are also recorded in an external blockchain, which
means that all of the parties can feel secure that they can re-create and
demonstrate the chain of events on their own, in the event that the
other parties suffer a breach of data or similar event.
Id. Moreover, “the land registry of Lantmäteriet is, in principle, entirely
separate from the solution.” Id. at 34. Some less ambitious projects only use the
blockchain as a data depository for the current register. See, e.g., Ian Allison,
Blockchain-Based Ubitquity Pilots with Brazil’s Land Records Bureau, INT.
BUS. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2017), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/blockchain-basedubitquity-pilots-brazils-land-records-bureau-1615518.
169. KEMPE, supra note 24, at 22. For the related problem of guaranteeing
who is authorized to transfer, this Swedish initiative seems to rely on mobile
phone identification:
Another central part is the identification of the actors who will have
rights to act in the system. For this, a secure ID solution is required.
This solution also needs to be easily accessible to the actors involved.
If we look to the future, we see a world where mobile phones play an
increasingly important part in the ID solutions being developed.
Id.
170. Id. at 26.
171. See supra notes 152–54 and accompanying text.
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the property title will not be granted is sharply reduced since the
system can ensure that the information that is required by law
is included in the system and is required by the system in order
for the parties to be able to provide their signature.”172
However, even if most refusals have been rooted in
bureaucratic errors, it is likely that the important refusals in
terms of value and legal security will be those that impede
dubious or even fraudulent transactions from damaging third
parties.173 In principle, it is unclear how they would be affected
by the new system. If this analysis is correct, two important
consequences follow. First, what is mentioned above about the
“initial” functions to be played by the land register in a
supposedly transitional period would likely become a permanent
feature of the system. Otherwise, there is a risk of inadvertently
transforming a register of rights or registration-of-title system
into a recordation-of-deeds system.174 Second, speeding up the
whole process and maintaining the same level of legal security
likely requires introducing at earlier stages an advanced
registration review. The “pending” titles repeatedly mentioned
in the White Paper would then be upgraded to “conditional”
property titles.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS ON FIRMS, CONTRACTS
AND PROPERTY
Blockchain is said to be “trustless,”175 pointing out that it
does not need trust to work. However, this trustless feature
needs to be qualified. Blockchain and other institutional and
physical technologies supporting more impersonal exchange in
fact replace trust between counterparties with all parties’ trust
towards some third-party intermediary, be it a register, an
organized exchange, a bank, a credit card system, etc.176
Blockchain enthusiasts claim that it gets rid of intermediaries
but this claim proves illusory: it is more a Holy Grail than a

172. KEMPE, supra note 24, at 32.
173. See, e.g., supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
174. ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 210–12.
175. See, e.g., Nikunj Jain, Blockchain: Why a Trust-Less System is the Most
Trustable System in the World, CRYPTOCOINS NEWS (Apr. 21, 2017),
https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/blockchain-trust-less-system-trustablesystem-world/.
176. See discussion supra note 36.
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realistic objective.177 The paper shows the major roles played by
different types of intermediaries. Their presence holds key
consequences for specialization opportunities, firms’ strategies,
and the structure of contracting and property processes:
First, blockchain applications will tend to rely on dual
structures of causal and formal transactions,178 with the formal
stage being highly abstract, using simple contracts and
enforcing a closed number of property rights. This excludes the
possibility of enforcing a wider variety of rights in rem.179
Second, the core peer-to-peer structure of blockchain faces
insurmountable difficulties to reach contractual completion and
to interact with the real word,180 two difficulties that have been
framed here in terms of, respectively, contract (in personam)
rights and property (in rem) rights.
Third, to overcome these difficulties and to complement its
core peer-to-peer structure, blockchain development will
encourage the proliferation of a myriad of new specialists to
provide effective contractual completion as well as interfaces
between the virtual and real worlds to most end users and for
most assets.181
Fourth, the emergence of specialized agents will reduce
some costs at the price of increasing agency costs, therefore
creating additional conflicts of interests. This will open up
additional opportunities for fraud and trigger greater demand
for centralized and specialized enforcement and regulation.182
More generally, because of the role of intermediaries,
blockchain is likely to affect transaction costs in all types of
transactions, modifying the comparative advantages of different
organizational forms and institutions, e.g., the optimal degree of
vertical and horizontal integration in business firms and other
organizations, and even the relative optimal scope of markets
and politics as information, decisional, and allocation
mechanisms. However, not only the extent but also the signs of
these impacts are open to question. Therefore, contrary to

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See discussion supra note 36.
See, e.g., supra note 166 and accompanying text.
Supra note 164 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra note 131 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text.
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common assertions, it is debatable if blockchain really favors
market transactions over business firms, and to what extent.183
Lastly, blockchain will find it easier to enable transactions
in personal (i.e, contractual, in personam) rights as compared to
real (i.e., property, in rem) rights. To move from the world of
personal rights to the world of real rights will require public
interfaces and interventions (at the very least, to establish the
status of the blockchain as judicial evidence). Therefore,
applications of blockchain in property transactions will likely be
limited to document notarization and the conveyance of smallstakes and possession-based transactions, as well as to, at the
most, the use of private blockchains for archiving purposes
within standard registration systems.

183. For instance, TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 14, at 142, claim that
“as technology continues to drop costs in the market, it’s conceivable that
corporations could and should have very little inside—except software and
capital”). The analysis here points out that powerful forces also operate in the
opposite direction: mainly, the emergence of new contractual specialists, who in
most cases will likely be organized as business firms instead of acting as
individuals.

***

